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UNIFORM ACTS-CAN THE DEAD HAND CONTROL THE DEAD 
BODY? THE CASE FOR A UNIFORM BODILY REMAINS LAW* 
INTRODUCTION 
Did former Red Sox slugger Ted Williams really want to be 
decapitated and cryonically frozen so that his bodily remains would 
spend eternity encapsulated in a building in the Arizona desert, 
much like items in a warehouse?1 Although his will stated that he 
wanted to be cremated, and that his remains should be scattered in 
the ocean off of Florida? two of the great baseball player's children 
maintained that he had signed a document agreeing to cryonic 
freezing of his remains.3 The document, however, is no more than a 
small, stained piece of paper, signed by Ted, his son John Henry, 
and his daughter Claudia, stating that they "agree to be put into 
bio-stasis" after they die, so that they may "be together in the fu­
ture, even if it is only a chance."4 The signatures are not witnessed; 
however, a "family attorney" claimed it was signed while Ted was in 
the hospital prior to surgery.s 
Baseball fans were outraged when they discovered what had 
happened to the Hall of Farner's bodily remains. A website is de­
voted to the cause of having Ted's body defrosted and cremated, as 
directed in his wil1.6 The broader problem is how this situation ever 
* This Note was the winner of the 2006 William J. Pierce Writing Contest spon­
sored by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
1. Shortly after Ted Williams's death, the former baseball player's body was flown 
to the Alcor Life Extension Foundation building in Arizona, where his head was re­
moved and placed in a "steel can filled with liquid nitrogen." Ted Williams Frozen in 
Two Pieces, CBS NEWS, Aug. 12, 2003, available at http://www.cbsnews.com!stories/ 
2002/12/20/nationaVmain533849.shtml. His body is stored separately in a similar steel 
tank. [d. 
2. Begging to Differ, SI.COM, Aug. 13, 2002, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/ 
basebaIVnews/2002/08/13/williams_daughtecap. The will can be viewed online. See 
The Smoking Gun, Archive, http://www.thesmokinggun.com!archive/tedwill1.html (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2007). 
3. What Happened to Ted?, SI.eoM, Aug. 12, 2003, http://sportsillustrated.cnn. 
comlbasebaWnews/2003/08/12/williams_si. 
4. Ted Williams Frozen in Two Pieces, supra note 1. A picture of the document 
can be viewed online. See The Smoking Gun, Archive, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/ 
archive/twletter1.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). 
5. Ted Williams Frozen in Two Pieces, supra note 1. 
6. Save Ted Williams, http://washdc.pages.web.com/saveted (last visited Feb. 20, 
2007). 
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occurred. That is, many legal practitioners would think that a dece­
dent's cremation directive, when set forth in a will, would be upheld 
and only revocable by a later document executed with testamentary 
formalities. 7 As this Note will show, however, a review of actual 
cases suggests otherwise. 
The case involving Ted Williams's bodily remains is one of 
many situations evidencing the need for more direction from legis­
latures for both citizens and the courts as to the best wayan individ­
ual may go about directing the disposition of his body.8 Many 
states have been unclear with respect to who has the right to make 
decisions regarding the disposition of a person's bodily remains. 
Furthermore, even in those states with statutes that do provide a 
mechanism allowing individuals to direct what will happen post­
mortem, the laws are not always clear or complete and can vary 
substantially from state to state. Moreover, because the law is not 
well-settled, many courts allow evidence beyond what would nor­
mally be acceptable in an attempt to interpret a deceased's wishes. 
This sends a message to those who are concerned about their bodily 
remains that there is almost no way to ensure a disposition accord­
ing to their wishes. 
The first Part of this Note discusses the evolution of the com­
mon law in the United States with respect to the disposition of bod­
ily remains, as well as those statutes that have codified the common 
law. The second Part of this Note outlines problems with the com­
mon law and those statutes that codify the common law without any 
further clarification. This Part also suggests that state legislatures 
should enact bodily remains statutes that go beyond the common 
law. The second Prt also shows the differences among the various 
state statutes that have been enacted, and posit that a uniform law 
is needed to resolve these differences. The final Part of this Note 
7. In Massachusetts in the 1930s, for example, the Boston law firm of Hale and 
Dorr issued an opinion to the Massachusetts Cremation Society recommending that a 
person interested in having his body cremated should set forth his instructions "in the 
will, in order that they may have the benefit of the special sanction and force of that 
instrument." RICHARD W. HALE & RAYMOND B. ROBERTS, CREMATION OF THE 
DEAD AND THE RIGHT TO CONTROL THE DISPOSITION OF ONE'S BODY 10 (un­
copyrighted, n.d.). 
8. The incident involving the remains of Ted Williams merely brought the issue to 
light. Problems with family members fighting over the remains of the deceased are 
becoming more and more common for funeral directors, some of whom have stated that 
they have hired security personnel to guard the doors and prevent altercations or have 
called police officers to remove "unwanted" people from the funeral services. Family 
Battles Over Remains Become Daily Occurrence for Industry, DEATH CARE Bus. ADVI· 
SOR, Aug. 8, 2002, at 3. 
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discusses the considerations involved in drafting a uniform law and 
proposes a sample uniform disposition of bodily remains act. 
I. BACKGROUND 
For many people, knowing how and where one's final remains 
will ultimately be disposed is important. People of faith, for exam­
ple, may be especially concerned with this issue.9 American courts 
have often recognized the importance to individuals of having some 
security about what will happen to their bodies post-mortem. As 
early as 1872, a Rhode Island court noted that "the burial of the 
dead is a subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a much 
greater degree than many matters of actual property."lO 
A. 	 The Evolution of the Common Law Regarding Disposition of 
Remains 
The laws of a majority of the states have evolved over the years 
from borrowing England's ecclesiastical law, which stated that a 
corpse was not considered property,11 to adopting the concept of 
the body as quasi-property.12 Because people were traditionally 
9. For example, imagine a person who originally came from an Orthodox Jewish 
family who had converted to Hinduism, or vice-versa. Members of the Jewish faith 
generally do not believe cremation is proper. In fact, "Jewish law teaches that the 
whole body should be buried, and that if parts have been removed, for examination or 
otherwise, they must be returned and buried with the rest of the body." Kohn v. United 
States, 591 F. Supp. 568,573 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting I. KLEIN, A GUIDE TO JEWISH 
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE 270 (1979); 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 932, 934 (1978); I. KLEIN, 
RESPONSA AND HALAKHIC STUDIES 38, 39 (1975». Hindus, on the other hand, believe 
strongly that cremation is the only way a body should be disposed. See, e.g., Death: The 
Last Taboo, Hindu, http://www.deathonline.net/disposal/cremation/hindu.cfm (last vis­
ited Feb. 20, 2007). Without the ability to leave instructions that a family member 
would be bound by, the Hindu may be concerned that his Jewish Orthodox family 
would direct that his body be buried. On the other hand, the Jewish Orthodox person 
may worry that her Hindu family would order her body to be cremated. 
10. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 237-38 (1872). The 
court also stated "[m]ost people look forward to the proper disposition of their remains, 
and it is natural that they should feel an anxiety on the subject." Id. at 239. This con­
cept is carried forward in the case of In re Estate of Moyer. In re Estate of Moyer, 577 
P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978) ("The matter of the disposition of the dead, and what hap­
pens after death, have always been among the serious concerns of mankind. For that 
and other reasons, which need no elaboration here, the subject is so involved in the 
public interest, including its health, safety and welfare, that it is not subject entirely to 
the desires, or the whim or caprice of individuals, but is subject to control by law."). 
11. HUGH Y. BERNARD, THE LAW OF DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD 16 
(2d ed. 1979). 
12. See, e.g., Pierce, 10 R.I. at 238 ("Although, as we have said, the body is not 
property in the usually recognized sense of the word, yet we may consider it as a sort of 
quasi property, to which certain persons may have rights, as they have duties to perform 
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buried in the church cemetery, the law in England regarding bodily 
remains was the province of the church rather than the courts.u In 
addition, the English courts struggled with how to describe a 
corpse, with one case referring to a corpse as being no more than a 
"lump of earth."14 Gradually, the English courts acknowledged 
that the family of the decedent had a right to possession of the 
corpse up until the time of burial; however, even then the courts 
would not allow an individual to direct that his body be cremated 
after death. is Furthermore, although people could petition a court 
for relief based on various causes of action regarding graves, such as 
a suit for destruction of a grave marker, the English legal system 
gave no rights to the next of kin to bring an action for custody of 
the body.16 The only right to bring a legal action for disturbance of 
a corpse rested with the Crown, which could bring criminal charges 
against the wrongdoerY 
America's legal system has its roots in England's jurispru­
dence, and courts originally agreed with the theory that there were 
no property rights in a corpse.18 In 1856, however, a New York 
court strictly rejected the English law with respect to corpses in a 
case involving the widening of streets in Manhattan, necessitating 
the disturbance of a cemetery. Attached to the case was a report by 
a referee19 named Ruggles, repudiating America's adoption of laws 
from an ecclesiastical court system.20 Although Referee Ruggles 
did not go so far as to suggest that there were property rights in a 
towards it arising out of our common humanity. But the person having charge of it 
cannot be considered as the owner of it in any sense whatever; he holds it only as a 
sacred trust for the benefit of all who may from family or friendship have an interest in 
it."). 
13. Id. at 236. 
14. LOUIS J. PALMER, JR., ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FROM EXECUTED PRISONERS 10 
(1999) (quoting Haynes' Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1389 (K.B. 1614». 
15. Id. at 12. 
16. Pierce, 10 R.I. at 227; see also PALMER, supra note 14, at 14 (quoting Rex v. 
Lynn, 100 Eng. Rep. 394 (1788) (quoting Lord Coke in the case of Rex v. Lynn: "It is to 
be observed that in every sepulcher, that hath a monument, two things are to be consid­
ered ... the burial of the cadaver ... belongs to ecclesiastical cognizance; but as to the 
monument, action is given at the common law for defacing thereof."». 
17. Pierce, 10 R.I. at 236 n.1 ("By the old English law the body was not recog­
nized as property, but the charge of it belonged exclusively to the church and the eccle­
siastical courts (as did also administration of estates). The only common law remedy 
for a wrongful removal was by criminal process."). 
18. PALMER, supra note 14, at 20. 
19. A referee is "a type of master appointed by a court to assist with certain 
proceedings. In some jurisdictions, referees take testimony before reporting to the 
court." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1306 (8th ed. 2004). 
20. BERNARD, supra note 11, at 14. 
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corpse, he set forth two pertinent conclusions in his report. First, 
Ruggles stated that "the right to bury a corpse and to preserve its 
remains, is a legal right, which the courts of law will recognize and 
protect. "21 Second, "[t]hat such right, in the absence of any testa­
mentary disposition, belongs exclusively to the next of kin. "22 
The courts in a majority of states adopted the Ruggles report, 
and its rejection of the English ecclesiastical law.23 While they 
agreed with Referee Ruggles that the body could not be considered 
property, it was not until 1872, in the Rhode Island case of Pierce v. 
Proprietors ofSwan Point Cemetery, that the term "quasi-property" 
was adopted to describe the limited rights of custody that were 
vested in the next of kin.24 The court in Pierce stated that although 
no one could claim ownership of a dead body, the next of kin 
should have custody of the body to "hold[ ] it only as a sacred trust 
for the benefit of all who may from family or friendship have an 
interest in it."25 
In another leading case, Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, a Pennsylvania 
court likened the quasi-property right of possession to being en­
trusted with the care of the decedent's corpse.26 In Pettigrew, the 
court turned for guidance to the system of probating wills, and de­
cided that the quasi-property right in a corpse vested first in the 
decedent's administrator or executor.27 The court stated that be­
cause it was incumbent upon the decedent's estate to pay the fu­
neral bills, the "duty to determine when, where, and in what 
manner the body shall be buried rest[ ed] with the executor or ad­
ministrator."28 Because the state intestacy statute, like many 
others, conferred the title of administrator of the decedent's estate 
upon the surviving spouse, or, if no spouse, then upon the next of 
kin, the court inferred that the duty to bury the decedent was 
21. Id. at 15. 
22. Id. The Ruggles report has been referred to as "a storehouse to which all 
subsequent discussions [about custody of remains] have resorted for materials." Petti­
grew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (Pa. 1904). 
23. BERNARD, supra note 11, at 14-15. But see In re Johnson's Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d 
81 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1938) (criticizing Ruggles's characterization of the English ecclesiastic 
law and referring to the Roman law in support of the holding that a testatrix did have 
the right to set forth cremation instructions in her will). 
24. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.1. 227, 238 (1872). 
25. Id. at 243. 
26. Pettigrew, 56 A. at 879. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
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vested first in the surviving spouse and then in the decedent's 
family.29 
The quasi-property theory with respect to corpses is still ac­
cepted today. The Ninth Circuit has even referred to the next of 
kin's right to take possession of a corpse as part of "our national 
common law."30 However, courts also recognize that individuals 
have a right, within the bounds of public health standards, to have 
their bodies disposed of according to their wishes.31 
B. Bodily Remains Statutes 
An example of an attempt at reconciling the tension between 
the quasi-property theory and a person's right to control the dispo­
sition of his body is evidenced by the status of the law in Massachu­
setts. Since the adoption of the quasi-property theory in 1897,32 
Massachusetts courts have consistently stated that "[i]n the absence 
of direction from the decedent," the surviving spouse or next of kin 
has the right to possession of a corpse for the purposes of burial.33 
29. Id. at 880. It has also been suggested that the idea of granting the spouse or 
next of kin custody of the body originated from early American times, where many 
communities did not yet have funeral homes to perform the requisite cleansing and 
funeral rites; instead, these duties were left up to the family to perform. Tanya K. Her­
nandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 992-93 (1999). 
30. Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002). 
31. As far back as the time of the Roman Empire, people had the right to direct 
the disposition of their remains. For example, one New York court noted the provision 
"in the Roman law [giving] express recognition of the right of a deceased by testament 
to direct his burial and to nominate the person to take charge of it." In re Johnson's 
Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81, 89 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1938). The court took its proposition from a 
translation of the Roman Pandects "(Book 11, title 7, section 12, subdivision 4) which 
appeared at 4 The Civil Law 90," construing the passage as: "He whom the deceased 
selected must conduct the funeral, but if he should not do so he will be liable to no 
penalty, unless something of value was left to him for this purpose; for then, if he does 
not comply with the will of the deceased, he will be excluded from the bequest." Id. at 
223. 
32. Burney v. Children'S Hosp. Boston, 47 N.E. 401, 402 (Mass. 1897). 
33. Stackhouse v. Todisco, 346 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Mass. 1976) ("In the absence of 
direction from the decedent, a surviving spouse, or, failing such a spouse ... , then the 
decedent's next of kin, have a 'possession' of the body so that they may dispose of it for 
burial according to their wishes."); see also Vaughn v. Vaughn, 200 N.E. 912, 913 (Mass. 
1936) ("[T]he right to possession of the dead body is in the surviving husband or wife, 
with the duty of burial, and not in the executor or administrator where there is no 
expressed wish of the testator as to the disposition of the remains."); Sheehan v. Com­
mercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 186 N.E. 627, 631 (Mass. 1933) ("The right of 
possession of a dead body for the purpose of burial or other lawful disposition and, 
consequently, for the purpose of an autopsy, subject to some limitations in the public 
interest, is vested, at least in the absence of a different provision by the deceased, in the 
surviving husband, wife or next of kin. "). 
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However, the Massachusetts legislature has not adopted a bodily 
remains statute setting forth what rights an individual has with re­
spect to disposition of bodily remains (other than organ donation). 
Instead, the right of an individual to direct the disposition of his or 
her remains may be found in the section of the Code of Massachu­
setts Regulations that concerns licensure of embalmers and funeral 
directors. The section states, in pertinent part, that if an individual 
does not have a "pre-need funeral services contract,"34 a funeral 
home shall 
give effect first to any wishes of the deceased person regarding 
the nature of the funeral goods and services to be provided, the 
manner in which funeral services are to be conducted, andlor the 
final disposition of the deceased person's remains, which have 
been expressed in any written document which was signed by the 
deceased person in the presence of a witness.35 
In the case where a decedent has not left instructions, the regula­
tion provides that the next of kin shall make the decision regarding 
disposition.36 
Massachusetts is one of many states with some form of legisla­
tion or regulations regarding bodily remains. However, as shown 
below, legislation and regulations vary widely from state to state, 
from directing that the last will and testament is the proper place 
for burial instructions to allowing an individual to appoint an agent 
to make decisions post-mortem. 
1. Directions in the Last Will and Testament 
A number of states have codified the concept that an individ­
ual's testamentary instructions as to disposition of bodily remains 
will be binding. For example, New York law37 "specifically con­
34. See infra note 82. 
35. 239 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.09(2) (2005). 
36. 239 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.09(3) ("To the extent that there is no pre-need fu­
neral services contract in effect at the time of death for the benefit of the deceased 
person, and no other valid written document indicating the wishes of the deceased per­
son with respect to the nature of the funeral goods and services to be provided, the 
manner in which funeral services are to be conducted, or the final disposition of the 
deceased person's remains, the funeral establishment and its agents or employees shall 
follow the directions of the deceased person's surviving kin [in the order specified by 
the Massachusetts intestacy statute]."). 
37. This was New York Penal Law § 2210, which was recodified as New York 
Public Health Law § 4201 when New York restructured its statutes. See N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW §§ 4200-4202 (McKinney 2001); see also Stewart v. Schwartz Brothers­
leffer Mem'l Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 968 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) ("Public Health 
Law former § 4201, the statute upon which many of the aforementioned cases rely, 
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fer [ red] upon a person 'the right to direct the manner in which his 
body shall be disposed of after his death.' "38 This statute provided 
judges with an unambiguous rule. When presented with a case in­
volving a conflict between the directions of the decedent as set 
forth in his last will and testament and certain members of the dece­
dent's family, the New York Surrogate's Court, with little discus­
sion, turned to the statute and ordered the body disposed according 
to the decedent's wishes.39 Oddly enough, when New York enacted 
its version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,40 the legislature 
repealed the prior statute and its surrounding sections in their en­
tirety, thereby leaving New York without a provision for disposition 
of bodily remains.41 In 1993, the Queens County Supreme Court 
noted the discrepancy in a case involving a dispute between a ho­
mosexual man's family and his companion as to the custody and 
disposal of his remains.42 The court thought the legislature had ap­
parently made a mistake in repealing the prior statute without mak­
ing any provision for a directive regarding bodily remains, and 
stated that "the law associated with this right [to direct the manner 
in which the body shall be disposed of after death] still exists. "43 
The New Jersey legislature has also adopted a law allowing a 
testator to include language in his will to designate who will direct 
the disposition of his body after death.44 Unlike the New York law, 
however, the New Jersey statute was enacted recently, in 2003.45 
provided that, 'A person has the right to direct the manner in which his body shall be 
disposed of after his death."'). 
38. In re Eichner's Estate, 18 N.Y.S.2d 573, 573 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1940) (quoting 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2210 (repealed 1970)). 
39. Id. 
40. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4200-4202. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is a 
uniform law that allows people to donate some or all of their body parts (such as kid­
neys, corneas, tissues, and bone marrow) for purposes of transplantation or research. 
See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
41. Stewart, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 968. 
42. Id. at 966-67. 
43. Id. at 968. The court noted that although the parties had settled the matter 
prior to the court issuing its final judgment (they agreed that the decedent's body would 
be cremated, with his companion receiving half of his ashes, and his family receiving the 
other half), this was an important enough matter that guidance for the future was 
needed, and stated that, in this situation, the decedent should have inserted language in 
his will that he did not desire a funeral ceremony in the Jewish tradition, and that he 
elected to have his body cremated instead. Id. at 969. However, because this decision 
was from a Surrogate's court, the question remains whether this statute has in fact been 
resurrected and whether the higher courts in New York would agree with that decision, 
or whether the New York legislature will address this matter at some point. 
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27-22 (West 2003). 
45. Id. 
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Therefore, the legal concept of setting forth one's wishes regarding 
post-mortem disposition in a will is not viewed as obsolete in some 
states, despite various difficulties associated with that practice.46 
2. 	 Laws Allowing the Appointment of an Agent 
As an alternative to directions in the will, a growing number of 
states have adopted legislation allowing an individual to appoint an 
agent to direct the disposition of her body. In 2005, Connecticut 
joined that group.47 Members of the Connecticut Bar Association's 
Estates and Probate Section requested that the law be enacted for 
various reasons, including difficult family situations,48 multiple mar­
riages, and different religious beliefs.49 Michael Schenker, a mem­
ber of the Executive Committee of the Connecticut Bar 
Association's Estates and Probate Section, spoke in favor of the bill 
before the Connecticut Judiciary Committee in early 2005.50 He 
noted that although attorneys could offer advice to clients about 
appointing an individual to handle financial and legal affairs in the 
event they become incapacitated, or appointing someone to make 
medical decisions in the event they are not capable, lawyers could 
not with certainty give a client the option of appointing an individ­
ual to control the client's bodily remains.51 Attorney Schenker 
stated that a "clear set of instructions" would give "some comfort to 
people" in allowing them to plan for the future and "avoid ... pub­
lic family conflicts."52 
3. 	 Laws Addressing Both the Direction of Disposal of 
Remains and the Appointment of an Agent 
Some legislatures allow individuals to have the best of both 
worlds; that is, they can choose to appoint an agent and they can 
provide directions as to the method of disposing their bodily re­
46. 	 See infra notes 76 & 78 and accompanying text. 
47. See 2005 Conn. Acts 197 (Reg. Sess.). The Act also allows an individual to 
provide directions as to the disposition of the body post-mortem. Id. 
48. In addition to difficult family relationships, our increasingly mobile culture 
has redefined what it means to be "family." However, this is not a new concept. In 
1938, the New York Surrogate's Court noted that "loosened family ties" was a factor in 
deciding who should have custody of a decedent's body. In re Johnson's Estate, 7 
N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1938). 
49. Public Hearing of Connecticut Judiciary Committee, 2005 Leg., Regular Sess. 
(Conn. Feb. 28, 2005) (testimony of Michael Schenker), available at http://www.cga.ct. 
gov /2005/JUDda ta/chr/2005JUD00228-R001200-CHR. h tm. 
50. 	 Id. 
51. 	 Id. 
52. 	 Id. 
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mains. The law enacted by the Connecticut legislature in 2005 al­
lows an individual to sign a document directing the disposition of 
his or her body and to "designate an individual to have custody and 
control of such person's body and to act as an agent to carry out 
such directions."53 Some states allow a person to do one or the 
other. For example, in Texas, if an individual has left instructions in 
accordance with the statute, such directions will be followed; in the 
absence of directions, the person designated as the individual's 
agent will have custody and control.S4 If there are no directions, 
and no agent designated, the next of kin will have the authority to 
make decisions. 55 
4. Laws Requiring Prepayment of Funeral Expenses 
Finally, there is a small minority of states that allows an indi­
vidual to direct the disposition of his bodily remains only where 
funeral costs have been prepaid.56 Idaho allows an individual to 
provide written instructions as to the disposition of remains as part 
of a funeral plan that has been "funded in advance of the death of 
the person leaving instructions. "57 California takes a similar ap­
proach in its statute by allowing a decedent to provide directions as 
to the disposition of his or her bodily remains, so long as payment 
arrangements by "any ... effective and binding means" have been 
made.58 The statute goes on to clarify that if funding arrangements 
are inadequate, the decedent's wishes shall be complied with, but 
only to the extent that funds are available, "unless the person or 
persons that otherwise have the right to control the disposition and 
arrange for funeral goods and services agree to assume the cost. "59 
53. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-318(a)(1) (West Supp. 2006). 
54. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(a) (Vernon 2003). 
55. [d. 
56. A prepaid funeral contract is not required in Massachusetts. Massachusetts 
law states that where a prepaid funeral contract is in place, the terms of that contract 
will be honored; however, if there is no prepaid contract, the funeral home should take 
the decedent's wishes into account when those wishes have been expressed in writing 
and witnessed. 239 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.09 (2005). 
57. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1139 (2003). 
58. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100.1(a)(2) (West Supp. 2005). 
59. [d. § 7100.1(b); cf ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2843-A(5) (West 2004) ("If 
the [decedent] has left written and signed instructions regarding funeral arrangements 
and disposal of the subject's remains, the person having custody and control shall abide 
by those wishes to the extent that the [decedent] paid for those arrangements in ad­
vance or left resources for the purpose of carrying out those wishes."). 
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C. Uniform Laws 
1. Background 
The diversity from state to state in bodily remains laws sug­
gests the need for a uniform bodily remains statute. The concept of 
uniformity of laws among the states is not a new one. As early as 
1889 the American Bar Association identified the need for consis­
tency of laws among the states, and in 1892 the first meeting of what 
is now known as the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) was held.60 The NCCUSL's mis­
sion is to examine state law to identify areas where uniformity is 
needed and promulgate uniform and model laws for use by the 
states.61 
One well-known uniform act is the Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act (UAGA).62 The UAGA resembles bodily remains law in that it 
"represented a departure from centuries of common-law precedent, 
which held that a body immediately after death became the prop­
erty of the next-of-kin."63 Even though the UAGA was enacted to 
address the vital need of making organs available for transplant a­
tion,64 a bodily remains law would address a matter of importance 
as well: giving people some security in knowing what will happen to 
their remains when they are no longer around to defend their 
wishes. 
2. Model Cremation Law 
The first model law regarding disposal of bodily remains was 
developed and distributed by the Cremation Association of North 
America in 1984.65 The Model Cremation Law has been updated at 
60. Uniform Law Comm'rs, About NCCUSL, Organization, http://www.nccusl. 
orglUpdate/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=O&tabid=l1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). 
61. Id. Of course, the most well-known uniform law is the Uniform Commercial 
Code. However, other uniform laws which have been widely adopted in some form 
include the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, which as of 2004 had been adopted in 
forty-seven jurisdictions, see NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, 
ANNUAL REPORT 2003-2004, at 6 (2004), and the Uniform Interstate Family Support 
Act, which has been adopted in all fifty states, see id. at 10. 
62. The 1967 version of the UAGA was adopted by all fifty states; however, since 
the Act's revision in 1987, only twenty-six states have adopted the amended Act. See 
REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 1 (Draft 2006), available at http://www.law. 
upenn.edulblllulc/uaga/april2006draft.pdf. 
63. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 61, at 13. 
64. Id. 
65. MODEL CREMATION LAW AND EXPLANATION pmbl. (Cremation Ass'n of N. 
Am. 1999), http://www.cremationassociation.orgldocs/model-cremation-law.pdf. 
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various times, most recently in 2003.66 The Association's general 
counsel developed the law after a review of the laws then in effect 
in the United States and Canada.67 However, because its drafting 
occurred at the behest of individuals and businesses offering crema­
tion services, the law contains language that is directed more to the 
funeral business than to consumers.68 Nonetheless, the model law 
served as a basis for many state legislatures that wanted to enact 
legislation allowing constituents to designate cremation as the 
method of disposition.69 
In addition to providing guidance and protection for crematory 
operators, the Model Cremation Law also contains provisions to 
protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices by the fu­
neral industry. For instance, one section of the law forbids crema­
tories from requiring that human remains be placed in a casket 
prior to cremation, a policy that was used mostly to line the pockets 
of the crematory owners.7° 
Now that other forms of disposal of bodily remains exist, such 
as cryonic preservation,71 state legislatures have begun adding lan­
guage to cremation authorization statutes allowing for options 
other than burial or cremation.72 Arkansas law, for example, pro­
vides that an individual "of sound mind and eighteen (18) or more 
years of age may execute at any time a declaration governing the 
final disposition of his or her bodily remains at his or her death, 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. For example, the model law uses terms taken from the FTC Funeral Rule 
such as "alternative container." Id. § l(A). See also § 3A(1) of the form, which states 
that the first authorizing agent will be "[a]ny person acting on the instructions of a 
decedent who authorized his or her own cremation through the execution, on a pre­
need basis, of a crematory authorization form." Id. § 3(A)(1). However, the defini­
tions section of the law does not define "pre-need basis," which seems to be more a 
term of art used in the funeral industry than something that is readily understood by 
consumers. 
69. In fact, many states whose statutes include the concept of an "authorizing 
agent" based their statutes on the Model Cremation Law. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 34-13-11, -121, -122 (LexisNexis 2002); MODEL CREMATION LAW AND EXPLANATION 
§ l(B) (definition of "Authorizing Agent(s)"). 
70. MODEL CREMATION LAW AND EXPLANATION § 7. 
71. Cryonics is not a twenty-first century phenomenon. The first cryonically pre­
served human was Dr. Harold Greene, who died on January 12, 1967. GEORGE P. 
SMITH, II, MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECfS OF CRYONICS: PROSPECfS FOR IMMORTALITY 9 
(1983). The first cryonics society in America was formed two years earlier, in 1965. Id. 
at 16. 
72. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-318(a)(1) (West Supp. 2006) 
("[D]isposition shall include, but not be limited to, cremation, incineration, disposition 
of cremains, burial, method of interment and cryonic preservation."). 
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provided the disposition is in accordance with existing laws, rules, 
and practices for disposing of human remains."73 
The effort of the Cremation Association of North America to 
promulgate a uniform law with respect to cremation is laudable, 
especially when viewed as an effort by the industry to police itself. 
However, with the emergence of new forms of disposition of re­
mains such as cryonics, the Model Cremation Law does not go far 
enough. Individuals must be assured that whatever their wishes 
are, such as interment in a certain place or manner, those wishes 
will be carried out when they are no longer able to speak for 
themselves. 
II. THE CASE FOR A UNIFORM BODILY REMAINS STATUTE 
A. 	 Because of Difficulties Associated with the Common Law, 
States Should Adopt Statutes Addressing the Disposition 
of Bodily Remains 
Although both the quasi-property theory of giving custody of 
bodily remains to the next of kin and the provisions giving the dece­
dent the right to direct the disposition of his corpse may seem clear, 
several questions remain unanswered. First, the common law is not 
clear as to the mechanism a decedent should use to declare his 
wishes. This could be something like Ted Williams's handwritten 
note,74 a testamentary statement in the decedent's will,75 or a pre­
paid funeral contract. Even in states where statutes or the common 
73. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-17-102(b)(1) (West Supp. 2005); see also MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-509(a) (LexisNexis 2005) ("Any individual who is 18 years of 
age or older may decide the disposition of the individual's own body after that individ­
ual's death without the pre death or post-death consent of another person by executing 
a document that expresses the individual's wishes regarding disposition of the body or 
by entering into a pre-need contract."). Most, if not all, of the statutes that follow the 
Model Cremation Act format, whether they provide for additional methods of disposi­
tion or not, state that in the absence of written direction from the decedent, the next of 
kin, in order of priority, can make the determination. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 5-509(c). 
74. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
75. See supra note 7. It was common in early America for decedents to include in 
their will instructions as to the place of their interment. For example, the will of Daniel 
Webster, who died in 1852, stated that his body was to "be buried in the family vault in 
Marshfield [Massachusetts]," and that he "be buried without the least show or ostenta­
tion." VIRGIL M. HARRIS, ANCIENT CURIOUS AND FAMOUS WILLS 448-49 (The 
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1999) (1911). The will of Grover Cleveland, who died in 1908, 
similarly requested minimal services and directed that his body be buried at the place 
where he was residing at the time of his death. Id. at 349. 
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law suggest that a last will and testament is the proper method, sev­
eral problems are associated with this practice. 
1. 	 Problems Associated with Directions Included in the 
Decedent's Last Will and Testament 
According to the quasi-property theory, a body is not consid­
ered "property," and therefore courts in some jurisdictions have 
found that a will is not the appropriate place for a decedent to 
make a disposition of his or her body.76 Even in those states where 
the right to dispose of a body by will has been codified,77 there are 
problems associated with that practice. In many instances, a will 
may not be located until after a decedent's body has been interred, 
at which point it may be too late to follow the decedent's wishes.78 
There is also a danger that, even if the will is located prior to 
disposition of the body, the decedent's testamentary wishes will not 
be carried out. In Florida, for example, the law seemed clear that 
"[i]n the absence of a testamentary disposition, the spouse of the 
deceased or the next of kin has the right to the possession of the 
body for burial or other lawful disposition."79 However, as set forth 
in the introduction, Ted Williams's handwritten note, executed 
without any testamentary formalities, was enough for a Florida 
court to allow his body to be cryonically frozen even though his will 
directed that his body be cremated.80 
In some cases, an oral expression of the decedent's wishes is 
sufficient for a court to disregard provisions in the will for disposi­
tion of the decedent's body. In a 2005 case, Cohen v. Guardianship 
of Cohen, the Florida District Court of Appeal held that the dece­
76. See, e.g., Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170, 171 (Cal. 1900) ("It is quite well estab­
lished ... that, in the absence of statutory provisions, there is no property in a dead 
body; that it is not part of the estate of the deceased person; and that a man cannot by 
will dispose of that which after his death will be his corpse."). 
77. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 38 & 44. 
78. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 29, at 1020. If a person had requested crema­
tion in his will but had first been interred, a court may decide not to order exhumation 
and cremation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Deeds, 61 N.W. 842, 842 (Iowa 1895) ("A proper 
appreciation of the duty we owe to the dead, and a due regard for the feelings of their 
friends who survive, and the promotion of the public health and welfare, all require that 
the bodies of the dead should not be exhumed, except under circumstances of extreme 
exigency."). Clearly, if a person's will requested burial, but the body had already been 
cremated, there would be no way to correct the mistake. 
79. Cohen v. Guardianship of Cohen, 896 So. 2d 9S0, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
200S) (citing Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 19S0», rev. denied, 911 So. 2d 
792 (Fla. 200S). 
80. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 2-S. 
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dent's wishes set forth in his last will and testament, although quite 
specific regarding how and where he should be interred, were not 
conclusive, and instead relied on testimony from the decedent's 
family as to what he had said about how and where he wanted to be 
buried.81 
As the Cohen case and the Ted Williams matter demonstrate, 
courts are willing to ignore provisions for disposition of the body 
that are contained in an individual's last will and testament. Not 
only do bodily remains statutes provide a concrete mechanism 
whereby an individual can direct the disposition of his corpse, but 
they would also help dissuade people from considering wills as 
"catch-all" documents where every post-mortem wish must be set 
forth. Furthermore, because a will may not be located until after a 
person's funeral services, a statute providing that wishes with re­
spect to disposition of remains should be set forth in a separate 
document may eliminate the difficulty of locating the will at the 
time of death. 
2. Problems Associated with Prepaid Funeral Contracts 
An alternative document to the will is the prepaid funeral con­
tract.82 However, even though they may be helpful in keeping the 
decedent's family from being overcharged at a time when they are 
81. Cohen, 896 So. 2d at 953. The decedent's will indicated that he wanted to "be 
buried in a 'traditional Jewish burial in [his) family plot in Mount Hebron Cemetery.'" 
Id. at 952. However, according to his widow, Mr. Cohen told her that he wanted to be 
buried with her in Florida, where they resided at the time. Id. at 951. He also discussed 
his wishes with his adult daughter. Id. at 955. The court, perhaps in order to reach 
what it thought was the "right" result (the judges may have felt that spouses are gener­
ally buried with one another, and the Cohens had been married for forty years when 
Mr. Cohen passed away), stated that because a body is not property, a will does not 
necessarily control with respect to disposition of mortal remains. Id. at 951. Based on 
that theory, the court "conclude[d) that a testamentary disposition is not conclusive of 
the decedent's intent if it can be shown by clear and convincing evidence that he in­
tended another disposition for his body." Id. at 954. The court affirmed the trial 
court's order of the burial of the decedent in the cemetery in Florida, with a space for 
his wife next to him. Id. 
82. This Note uses the phrases "pre-need funeral contract" and "prepaid funeral 
contract" interchangeably. The term "pre-need funeral contract" is defined as "any 
written agreement ... in which ... the licensed funeral establishment agrees, prior to 
the death of a named person, to furnish funeral goods and/or services ... and the buyer, 
pursuant to that agreement, transfers or tenders funds to the licensed funeral establish­
ment for the purpose of paying all or part of the cost of those funeral goods and/or 
services." 239 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.01 (2005). The term "pre-need" contract, as op­
posed to "prepaid" contract, was probably an invention of the funeral industry's mar­
keting division. 
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particularly vulnerable, prepaid funeral contracts are problematic.83 
For example, Clara Cochran, who died in Tennessee on September 
30, 2005, had purchased a prepaid funeral contract so that her chil­
dren would not have to worry about paying for her funeral when 
the time came.84 However, when the time did come, Ms. Cochran's 
children discovered that the cemetery corporation with which their 
mother had arranged her funeral had unexpectedly closed its doors 
without leaving a forwarding address.85 
In addition to the lack of uniform regulation to protect con­
sumers,86 difficulties with prepaid funeral contracts include the lack 
of portability87 and the fact that younger people who have not been 
diagnosed with a terminal illness rarely have a prepaid plan in 
place.88 Furthermore, although one can use a prepaid funeral con­
tract to lock in a guaranteed price, many people are unaware that 
they are not obligated to spend thousands of dollars on a funeral. 
Most states do not require embalming of a corpse, though they do 
require that any person who embalms corpses be licensed.89 
Bodily remains statutes can help protect consumers since they 
would make it clear that an individual does not have to enter into a 
pre-funded contract with a funeral home in order to make sure his 
83. FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE PRICE OF DEATH: A SURVEY METHOD AND CON­
SUMER GUIDE FOR FUNERALS, CEMETERIES AND GRAVE MARKERS 1-2 (1975). 
84. Jamie Satterfield, Cemetery Closes Abruptly, FUNERAL WIRE, Oct. 12,2005, 
http://www.funeralwire.com/article.php?id= 14881. 
85. Id. 
86. Judith A. Frank, Preneed Funeral Plans: The Case for Uniformity, 4 ELDER 
L.J. 1, 1-2 (1996). 
87. Several problems arise when a person with a prepaid funeral contract moves 
from one state to another, such as whether the contract can be transferred, and whether 
the consumer will incur a penalty for transferring the contract. See id. at 34-36. 
88. A 1991 survey by the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) re­
vealed that the "average purchaser" of a pre-need funeral contract was over seventy. 
[d. at 5. 
89. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 114, § 43M (2004) ("Except as otherwise pro­
vided by law ... every dead body of a human being dying within the commonwealth ... 
shall be decently buried, entombed in a mausoleum, vault or tomb or cremated within a 
reasonable time after death."). People who want the funeral ritual to have more per­
sonal meaning may opt to wash and bathe the body of their deceased friend or family 
member themselves and have a service at home, prior to delivering the body to the 
crematory or having the body buried. For example, Final Passages, a not-for-profit or­
ganization in California, provides educational material about home funeral planning. 
See Final Passages, http://www.finalpassages.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). Others 
may choose a simpler interment because they are concerned with the long-term effects 
that burying embalming fluid, concrete vaults, and steel caskets might have on the envi­
ronment. There is at least one nature park dedicated to natural burial of human re­
mains. See Ramsey Creek Preserve, Our Mission, http://www.ramseycreekpreserve. 
corn/mission.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). 
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or her wishes are respected. Because many people move from state 
to state at different times in their lives, a binding funeral contract in 
one state that is not easily portable to another state can cause great 
difficulty. Furthermore, because of inadequate consumer protec­
tion in the field of funeral contracts, statutes that do not require the 
deposit of money with a funeral home that may not be in business 
the following year would offer consumers a greater level of security. 
3. 	 The Law is Unclear as to Whether the Right to 

Possession is Also the Right to Make Decisions 

A further difficulty with the common law is that it is not clear 
whether the "right to possession" includes the right to make deci­
sions as to the disposition of the body, a duty to follow the dece­
dent's directives, or merely a duty to pay for the proper disposition 
of the corpse. In the Pettigrew case, for example, the court saw the 
right of possession as more of a duty to perform a service than the 
privilege of making decisions.90 The court stated that the right of 
the family to make decisions was limited by the decedent's wishes, 
but refused to adopt a bright line test, instead saying that "[h]ow far 
the desires of the decedent should prevail against those of a surviv­
ing husband or wife is an open question, but as against remoter 
connections, such wishes[,] especially if strongly and recently ex­
pressed, should usually prevail."91 
The common law rule that the spouse or next of kin shall have 
custody of the decedent's remains is partially based upon the rules 
of intestacy;92 however, like the laws of intestacy, it does not take 
into account the real-life relationship between the parties. Instead, 
the rules are based upon a familial relationship that may be in name 
only.93 Furthermore, they treat married and unmarried people dif­
ferently. For example, if an individual dies while married, it is the 
spouse who has the right to make the decisions with respect to dis­
position of the corpse; if an unmarried individual dies, it is his par­
ents or other blood relatives who will make that decision. Unlike 
the common law rules for disposition of bodily remains, however, 
the law of wills (with the exception of spousal share provisions) 
gives people the ability to avoid the intestacy provisions in the 
90. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (Pa. 1904) ("The duty of disposition ... 
devolves upon some one and must carry with it the right to perform."). 
91. 	 [d. at 880. 
92. 	 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
93. 	 Hernandez, supra note 29, at 988. 
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event they do not want property passing to an undeserving next of 
kin.94 
4. 	 Difficulties Associated with the Common Law Lead to 
Litigation 
Disputes among next of kin over the remains of one of their 
relatives can lead to protracted litigation. The Connecticut case in­
volving the bodily remains of Olga Gallagher symbolizes the prob­
lem with laws that give a preference to one family member over 
another with respect to control of a decedent's body. Mrs. Gal­
lagher died in Connecticut on December 5, 1961, while married to 
Kenneth Gallagher.95 Mr. Gallagher intended to cremate his wife's 
remains; however, before he could do so, Mrs. Gallagher's parents, 
Mr. and Mrs. Tkaczyk, acting pro se, filed a petition with the North 
Haven Probate Court to take custody of their daughter's corpse, 
based upon their claim that cremation was against their religion and 
allegations that relations between their daughter and her husband 
had been strained prior to her death.96 In March of 1965, after the 
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors heard and dismissed several 
of the plaintiffs' motions,97 the New Haven Superior Court denied 
the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction98 based upon the 
statute that was in effect at the time, which provided that the sur­
viving spouse should have custody and control of the remains of the 
decedent.99 The case eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. IOO 
94. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 
LAW & INEQ. 1, 1 (2000) ("An intestacy statute can serve as a default rule, but a person 
whose wishes do not fit the default rule must execute a will."). 
95. 	 Tkaczyk v. Gallagher, 222 A.2d 226, 227 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965). 
96. 	 Id. 
97. See, e.g., Tkaczyk v. Levine ex reI. Gallagher, 197 A.2d 943 (Conn. 1963) (dis­
missing plaintiffs' motions for an injunction and for action under Canon 11 of Judicial 
Ethics based upon lack of jurisdiction); Tkaczyk v. Levine ex reI. Gallagher, 197 A.2d 
942 (Conn. 1963) (dismissing plaintiffs' appeal from New Haven Superior Court for 
failure to prosecute). 
98. 	 Tkaczyk, 222 A.2d at 228. 
99. 	 Id. 
100. In 1966, Mr. and Mrs. Tkaczyk, along with the decedent's sister, Julia 
Cravens, engaged the services of an attorney and turned to the federal court system for 
help. Not wanting to leave anyone out, the plaintiffs brought suit against twenty-two 
defendants, including Mr. Gallagher, various Connecticut judges, officials, and attor­
neys, alleging denial of due process and infringement of their religious freedom by the 
defendants. Tkaczyk v. Gallagher, 259 F. Supp. 584, 585-86 (D. Conn. 1966). The 
plaintiffs requested that the court award them in excess of one million dollars in dam­
ages. ld. at 585. After a four hour hearing, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint 
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What is most disturbing is not the expenditure of the time and 
effort of the courts, attorneys, and litigants involved in the Tkaczyk 
matter, but that Olga Gallagher's body remained frozen in storage, 
without a proper disposition, for at least five years while the various 
cases worked their way through the courtS. lOl It may be that the 
situation could have been avoided if Mrs. Gallagher had a legal 
right to appoint her parents as her funeral planning agents, or if she 
had a right to specify how her remains were to be disposed. Fur­
thermore, even if Mrs. Gallagher did not have a declaration instru­
ment in effect at the time of her death, if the allegations of the 
Tkaczyks were correct and Mr. and Mrs. Gallagher had been legally 
separated at the time of her death, a carefully drafted bodily re­
mains statute would have precluded Mr. Gallagher from cremating 
his wife's body.102 
A similar problem has arisen with respect to the bodies of 
fallen members of America's armed services. The Department of 
Defense, rather than requiring that a soldier designate a person to 
take custody of her remains should she die while in the service, has 
a blanket policy of giving the soldier's remains to the oldest person 
in a class, for example, the older parent.103 As of October 2005, 
there were at least two sets of parents waging battles over the re­
mains of their children who died while serving in Iraq.104 This has 
prompted one United States Representative105 to suggest to the 
Department of Defense that they require each member of the 
armed services to make a designation as to who should receive his 
or her bodily remains. lo6 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and ordered an inquiry into the actions of the 
Tkaczyks' attorney with a view toward possible discipline. Id. at 586. At least twelve 
attorneys were involved in defending the action. Id. at 585. Attached to the federal 
court's decision were letters from various clerks of Supreme Court Justice Harlan deny­
ing the Tkaczyks' four requests for stays in the matter. Id. at 588-91. Never ones to 
quit, they filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, which was denied, 
Tkaczyk v. Gallagher, 386 U.S. 1013 (1967), as was their petition for rehearing, Tkaczyk 
v. Gallagher, 387 U.S. 938 (1967). 
101. Tkaczyk, 259 F. Supp. at 585. 
102. See, e.g., PROPOSED UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF BODILY REMAINS ACT § 5, 
infra Part III.C. 
103. Greg Sandoval, Parents of Soldier Killed in Iraq Meet in Court, 
SFGATE.COM, Oct. 3, 2005, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2005/10/03/ 
state/n102301D27.DTL. 
104. Id. 
105. The Representative involved in this issue was Sam Farr, a Democrat from 
California. Id. 
106. Id. 
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Bodily remains statutes can help reduce the number of court 
cases involving corpses. For example, if Mrs. Gallagher had known 
that her parents and husband did not get along, she may have taken 
advantage of a law allowing her to execute a document giving one 
or the other the right to make decisions. On the other hand, bodily 
remains statutes certainly would not prevent litigation. As with a 
will, a declaration document would be subject to challenge based 
upon factors such as duress or undue influence. However, compli­
ance with statutory execution formalities would lend support to the 
validity of the document, reducing litigation by providing predict­
able outcomes. 
B. 	 Because the Extreme Difference in States' Approaches Leads 
to Lack of Portability and Unpredictability, a Uniform 
Law is Needed 
The promulgation of a uniform law would aid state legislatures 
in adopting bodily remains statutes. As set forth above, laws in dif­
ferent states provide individuals with different rights with respect to 
disposition of bodily remains. For example, of those states that 
have enacted bodily remains laws, some allow an individual to sign 
a document directing what should be done with his or her re­
mains,107 but legislators in some states seem uncomfortable with al­
lowing the decedent's wishes to take precedence over the wishes of 
the surviving spouse, especially when the two conflict.10S Other 
states allow for the appointment of an agent who would make deci­
sions after an individual's death.109 Still other states allow for the 
107. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-1D2(b)(1) (West Supp. 2005) (A person 
"of sound mind and eighteen (18) or more years of age may execute at any time a 
declaration governing the final disposition of his or her bodily remains at his or her 
death, provided the disposition is in accordance with existing laws, rules, and practices 
for disposing of human remains."). 
108. Until recently, the law in Ohio provided that the wishes of the decedent's 
spouse took precedence over the decedent's wishes. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4717.22(A) (West 2004) (establishing a list of agents who could authorize the crema­
tion of a decedent, listing, in order of priority, first the decedent's spouse, and then 
"[a]ny person acting on the instructions of a decedent who authorized [his] own crema­
tion"). The new law, which went into effect on October 12, 2006, does away with plac­
ing the spouse in a position superior to the decedent. See H.R. 426, 126th Gen. Assem., 
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4717.22). Note, however, 
that the bill as originally written and as enacted in the Senate included the concept of 
allowing a decedent's agent or family member to overrule a decedent's cremation direc­
tive. See Proposed § 4717.21(C)(2) of 2005 Ohio H.B. No. 426 (text as of Nov. 15, 
2005), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.uslBillText126/126_HB_ 426_C Y.pdf. 
109. The agent is termed a "funeral planning agent" in Rhode Island. See R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 5-33.3-2(a) (2004). 
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appointment of an agent, but only within an advance directive for 
health care document (sometimes referred to as a health care 
power of attorney).110 There are also states that allow an individual 
to appoint an agent and provide directions as to what should be 
done with the body.111 
In some states where the current sepulture statute merely 
tracks the common law right of the next of kin to dispose of the 
body, or suggests that an individual can direct the disposition of her 
remains only by entering into a prepaid funeral contract, legislators 
are seeking to provide more options. For example, the Ohio legis­
lature recently revamped the Ohio sepulture statute to allow an in­
dividual to appoint an agent and provide directions regarding the 
disposition of remains. 112 It is inefficient for each legislature to re­
search the laws in effect in other states and draft a proposed bi11.113 
A uniform act would provide lawmakers with a suggested form. 
Furthermore, uniform acts encourage efficiency by "facilitat[ing] 
the development of a repository of judicial decisions that aid inter­
pretation of statutory terms."114 
Most important to consumers, the difference in the laws from 
state to state with respect to bodily remains creates unnecessary 
confusion. As an example, the note signed by Ted Williams and his 
two children directing that they be frozen may be acceptable ac­
cording to the laws of some states, while in others it would be inva­
lid because it had not been executed properly.11S Moreover, an 
110. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9702(a) (Supp. 2005). An advance direc­
tive is a "document that takes effect upon one's incompetency and designates a surro­
gate decision-maker for healthcare matters." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
19, at 57. 
111. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-318(a) (Supp. 2006). 
112. See supra note 108. 
113. This is especially difficult for part-time lawmakers. See Larry E. Ribstein & 
Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 
131, 140 (1996) ("Uniform lawmaking agencies, by concentrating their resources on 
particular laws, can hire experts in particular fields or in statutory drafting. By contrast, 
state legislators are often part-time generalists who have little incentive to spend time 
finely crafting legislation in particular areas and lack the resources to hire advisors."). 
On the other hand, it may be that the drafting process produces more innovative legis­
lation. See id. at 140-41. 
114. Id. at 138. 
115. Arkansas law requires there be two witnesses to the person's signature. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-1D2(b)(2) (West Supp. 2005). California, on the other hand, 
merely requires the document be in writing. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ nOO.1(a) (West Supp. 2005). While the signatures of Ted's children could be viewed 
as witnesses to the document, it is not clear from the face of the document whether they 
signed at the same time or separately. See supra note 4. 
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individual who used a form to validly appoint an agent in one state 
might find that another state does not recognize the right to appoint 
an agent for funeral planning. In addition, the differences in the 
laws from state to state create a hardship for people who frequently 
move or travel. A person moving from one state to another would 
have to research the laws of the new state to determine whether his 
current bodily remains directive would be valid.116 Furthermore, 
the person might discover that he no longer had a right to appoint 
an agent, or that he could not specify where his remains should be 
interred. 
Uniform laws are developed with the goal of consistency 
among state laws. The NCCUSL criteria for adoption of a uniform 
law require, among other things, "an obvious reason for an Act on 
the subject such that its preparation will be a practical step toward 
uniformity of state law or at least toward minimizing its diver­
sity."117 Like the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, a uniform bodily 
remains act would provide a means for those individuals who had 
certain beliefs or desires concerning the disposition of bodily re­
mains to be sure that their wishes would be carried out. Further­
more, a uniform act, even if not adopted by all states, would, at the 
very least, provide guidelines for interested lawmakers as to what 
their legislation should include. 
The NCCUSL has found that legislatures are more likely to 
adopt certain types of uniform laws, including those that may not 
have "substantial interstate implications," but nonetheless address 
emerging areas of the law, modernize the law, or "codify the com­
mon law."118 A uniform bodily remains law would address novel 
methods of preservation, such as cryonics. Furthermore, such a law 
may go beyond codifying the common law, which states that an in­
dividual has the right to direct the disposition of bodily remains, by 
allowing the individual to appoint someone to carry out his or her 
wishes after death. 
116. In today's increasingly mobile society, it is not hard to imagine a person who 
was born and raised in one state, but who spent his adult life in other states, desiring to 
be buried with the rest of his family in his home state. See, e.g., Cohen v. Guardianship 
of Cohen, 896 So. 2d 950 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005), rev. denied, 911 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 
2005). 
117. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, STATEMENT OF 
POLICY ESTABLISHING CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR DESIGNATION AND CONSIDER­
ATION OF ACTS (2001), available at http://www.nccus\'orglnccusIlDesktopDefault.aspx? 
tabindex=4&tabid=42. 
118. [d. 
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C. Summary 
The advantages of bodily remains statutes, and a uniform bod­
ily remains law, are many. A uniform law adopted by a majority of 
states would allow for the acceptance of bodily remains directives 
executed in different states. As evidenced by the Cohen case, it is 
not unusual for an individual to execute a document in one state 
and move to another state without updating the document.119 In 
addition, a uniform law would reduce the confusion created by the 
differences among state laws with respect to bodily remains. 
Bodily remains legislation is also advantageous in that it helps 
to reduce litigation or, at the very least, provides a mechanism for 
individuals who foresee possible litigation to avoid it. In addition, if 
a uniform bodily remains act was adopted by many legislatures, it 
might, in turn, encourage the United States to require its soldiers to 
execute a bodily remains declaration, which would help preclude 
litigation over the bodies of fallen servicemen and women. 
Finally, a uniform act would help in protecting consumers by 
not requiring them to enter into prepaid funeral contracts in order 
to ensure that their wishes are carried out. Because many people 
move from one state to another at different times in their lives, a 
binding funeral contract in one state that is not easily portable to 
another state can cause great difficulty. However, any uniform act 
should address the matter of payment for funeral services so as not 
to foster litigation over that subject. 
III. CONSIDERATIONS AND COMPONENTS OF A UNIFORM LAW 
A uniform bodily remains law should allow for the portability 
of the document from state to state. In today's mobile society, a 
person who executes an appointment-of-agent document in Massa­
chusetts should not have to execute a new document when the per­
son moves to Connecticut. A review of statutes of all states 
allowing for the appointment of an agent or the provision of direc­
tions for disposition of the body is beyond the scope of this Note; 
however, this Part will outline various considerations that any legis­
lature wishing to adopt a uniform act should consider. Finally, this 
Part will propose a template for use as a uniform act. 
119. Cohen, 896 So. 2d 950. In fact, probate or estate uniform laws are among the 
most widely adopted by the states, perhaps because legislators recognize the costs to 
individuals of having to update estate planning documents each time they move. Rib­
stein & Kobayashi, supra note 113, at 150. 
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A. Conflict with Constitutional Provisions 
Before adopting new legislation, a state's legislature must ex­
amine the new law for compliance with the Constitutions of both 
the United States and that particular state. A concern in the area of 
bodily remains legislation is the possibility that the law will run 
afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process provisions.12o 
1. Fourteenth Amendment Issues 
Even though a corpse is not "property" under the law,121 dis­
position of a corpse without giving notice to, or obtaining the per­
mission of, the spouse or next of kin may be a deprivation of the 
family member's due process rights. This denial of due process 
rights by a person acting in accordance with state laws can give rise 
to a cause of action under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, which states, in perti­
nent part, that: 
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri­
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re­
dress ....122 
For example, in one Sixth Circuit case, Brotherton v. Cleve­
land, a wife whose husband's corneas had been removed from his 
corpse without her permission had a legitimate civil rights claim 
under § 1983 against the coroner who allowed the cornea removal 
and the eye bank that received the corneas, among others.123 In 
order to have a valid § 1983 claim, Mrs. Brotherton needed to show 
that she had been deprived of a constitutional right (here, a depri­
vation of property) "under color of state law."124 In addition, Mrs. 
Brotherton had to demonstrate that "either (1) the conduct was 
caused by 'established state procedure rather than random and un­
authorized action,' or (2) the means of redress for property depriva­
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 11-25. 
122. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000). 
123. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 478-79, 482 (6th Cir. 1991), affd in 
part, rev'd in part, 173 F.3d 552 (1999), remanded to 141 F. Supp. 2d 894 (2001). 
124. Id. at 479. 
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tions provided by the state ... fail[ed] to satisfy the requirements of 
procedural due process."125 
The court dispensed with the "under color of state law" ele­
ment quickly.126 The bulk of the court's opinion was devoted to the 
issue of whether Mrs. Brotherton had a property interest in her hus­
band's corpse such that she could be said to have been deprived of 
that property without due process of law.127 The court found that 
in previous cases, Ohio courts had categorized the quasi-property 
theory as a "legal fiction" when applied to corpses.128 However, the 
court also recognized that the common law of Ohio conferred upon 
a surviving spouse the right to possess a corpse "for the purposes of 
preparation, mourning and burial."129 The court stated that it 
would make its determination based upon the "substance of that 
right," rather than the label given to the right (i.e., "quasi-prop­
erty").130 The court then reviewed the provisions of the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act as adopted in Ohio, and concluded that "the 
aggregate of rights granted by the state of Ohio to Deborah Broth­
erton," including the right to direct the disposition of her husband's 
body and the possessory right granted by the Anatomical Gift Act, 
along with the common law rights of possession, amounted to a 
"'legitimate claim of entitlement'" in her husband's corpse,131 
Based on Mrs. Brotherton's "legitimate claim of entitlement," the 
state of Ohio deprived her of her rights to due process when it au­
thorized the coroner to remove her husband's corneas without first 
holding a hearing,132 
125. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984». 
126. Id. The Ohio law with respect to cornea removal allowed "coroner[s] to 
remove ... corneas [from corpses so long as they had] no knowledge of an objection by 
the decedent, the decedent's spouse, or, if there is no spouse, the next of kin, the guard­
ian, or the person authorized to dispose of the body." Id. at 478; accord OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2108.60(B)(4) (2006). One of the problems in the Brotherton case was 
that the coroner's office involved in the lawsuit had a policy of not looking at a dece­
dent's medical record prior to the cornea removal, and so the employees could claim a 
lack of knowledge regarding a decedent's or next of kin's objections to the procedure. 
Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 478. Because these employees were acting in accordance with 
"the established policy of the coroner's office," they were acting "under color of state 
law." /d. at 479. 
127. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 479-82. 
128. Id. at 480 (quoting Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass'n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 
434 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986». 
129. Id. at 480-81 (quoting Everman v. Davis, 561 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1989». 
130. Id. at 481-82. 
131. Id. at 482. 
132. Id. 
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Five years later, the Sixth Circuit made a similar ruling in a 
case applying Michigan law rather than Ohio law. In Whaley v. 
County of Tuscola, the court examined the Michigan Anatomical 
Gift Act and concluded that it was "in substance the same [as 
Ohio's] regarding the next of kin's rights in a deceased relative's 
body."133 
2. The Solution to Fourteenth Amendment Issues 
The NCCUSL, in the course of revising the Uniform Anatomi­
cal Gift Act, modified the section regarding consent based upon the 
Brotherton decision and other § 1983 actions.134 The 2006 version 
of the Act does not allow coroners or medical examiners to author­
ize organ donation; rather, the decedent or the decedent's next of 
kin are the only ones who can make the authorization.135 
Any drafter of a uniform bodily remains act should review the 
Brotherton decision and its progeny, because a family's rights to 
bring suit for unlawful disposition extend beyond cornea removals. 
In one Florida case, Crocker v. Pleasant, a decedent's parents sued 
the local police department in the city where their son's body was 
found, claiming that their due process rights were violated when the 
police buried their son's corpse without first notifying them.136 The 
Supreme Court of Florida agreed that the Crockers did have a lim­
ited property interest in their son's body and therefore had "a right 
to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution prior to the deprivation of their prop­
erty interest."137 
Each of these § 1983 decisions was based on the state's com­
mon law, that is, the "quasi-property" right of the next of kin in the 
133. Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1114 (6th Cir. 1995). The court 
also examined Michigan common law, which went further than Ohio's in giving "the 
next of kin ... a right to possess [a] body for burial and [to] prevent its mutilation." Id. 
at 1115. The Sixth Circuit based its decisions mainly on constitutional law jurispru­
dence; the majority in Brotherton never discussed the public policy behind the cornea 
removal statute. See Brotherton, 923 F.2d 477. However, the dissent noted the impor­
tance of cornea transplants in restoring sight to blind people as opposed to the de 
minimis intrusion of removing a corpse's corneas prior to turning the body over to the 
family for disposal. Id. at 483 (Joiner, J., dissenting). For a more in-depth discussion of 
the importance of allowing removal of corneal tissue from cadavers, see State v. Powell, 
497 So. 2d 1188, 1190-91 (Fla. 1986). 
134. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GlFr ACT (2006), at 9, available at http://www. 
law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uaga/2006final.pdf. 
135. Id. at 55. 
136. Crocker v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 980-81 (Fla. 2001). 
137. Id. at 980, 988, 991. 
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decedent's body.13s Therefore, any uniform act should be clear 
about what rights, if any, the decedent's family has to object to the 
decedent's directives and, if they do have a right to object, what sort 
of "procedural safeguards [would be] built into the ... procedure of 
effecting the deprivation."139 This could include an opportunity to 
request an injunction from a probate court or, at the very least, a 
time period during which certain persons are given notice of the 
intended disposition of the body.140 
B. 	 Format of the Proposed Act: A Uniform Act Should Allow 
for Both the Appointment of an Agent and Direction by 
the Decedent 
Any statute should be clear as to what rights an individual has 
with respect to his remains. Furthermore, in order to provide maxi­
mum flexibility, an individual should be able to do more than direct 
the manner in which her body should be disposed. Therefore, a 
uniform act should include a provision allowing an individual to ap­
point an agent to carry out that individual's wishes and make deci­
sions if necessary.141 
138. Whether a property interest is protected under the Due Process Clause is 
based upon state law. Sch. Comm. of Hatfield v. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.E.2d 237, 238-39 
(Mass. 1977). 
139. Crocker, 778 So. 2d at 990 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 
(1990». 
140. In addition to the due process rights accorded by the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the United States Constitution, state constitutions likewise afford due process 
protections to their citizens. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and 
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 501 (1977) ("Prior to the 
adoption of the federal Constitution, each of the rights eventually recognized in the 
federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in one or more state constitu­
tions."). However, many states do not provide more stringent protections. New York 
and California courts have interpreted their state constitutions as providing the same 
safeguards with respect to due process rights. See People v. David W., 733 N.E.2d 206, 
210 (N.Y. 2000); Gray v. Hall, 265 P. 246, 252 (Cal. 1928). Therefore, any legislature 
adopting a uniform act would be advised to review state constitutional jurisprudence to 
examine what due process rights are afforded. At this time, a uniform act that passed 
muster under the Fourteenth Amendment may be sufficient, because the constitutions 
of many states provide the same due process protections. See, e.g., David w., 733 
N.E.2d at 210; Gray, 265 P. at 252. However, if federal due process protections are 
minimized, it may be that state courts will increase the level of due process protections 
afforded under state constitutions. See, e.g., Brennan, supra, at 503 ("If the Supreme 
Court insists on limiting the content of due process to the rights created by state law, 
state courts can breathe new life into the federal Due Process Clause by interpreting 
their common law, statutes and constitutions to guarantee a 'property' and 'liberty' that 
even the federal courts must protect."). 
141. The act of appointing someone to serve as funeral planning agent can be 
compared to the situation of using a living will versus appointing a health care proxy. 
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One way that some states allow for the appointment of an 
agent is by the use of health care proxies or durable powers of at­
torney for health care. Vermont's advance directive statute pro­
vides that the health care agent may also "make or refuse to make 
an anatomical gift, and ... arrange for the disposition of the princi­
pal's remains, including funeral goods and services."142 
There are advantages and disadvantages to including the ap­
pointment of an agent for the disposal of bodily remains in the ad­
vance directive. One advantage is having one form that serves a 
number of different needs, such as appointing a health care agent 
and a funeral planning agent, and making anatomical gifts (or ap­
pointing someone to make anatomical gifts after death). It makes 
some sense that the decision regarding what should happen to one's 
body after death includes both funeral planning and organ donation 
provisions. Furthermore, many people are familiar with advance 
directives143 so this would not be an entirely foreign concept. On 
In a living will, a person sets down concrete instructions regarding end of life wishes. 
Eric C. Miller, Listening to the Disabled: End-of-Life Medical Decision Making and the 
Never Competent, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2889, 2896 (2006). The living will is usually not 
able to predict advances in medical technology or the actual situation the patient may 
be in. See id. at 2897 (noting that "living wills cannot usually anticipate the exact cir­
cumstances in which future decisions must be made"). However, a health care agent is 
able to take into account the patient's medical situation at that time and determine 
what the patient would have wanted. See, e.g., id. at 2897 n.71 (outlining a hypothetical 
of a person suffering from dementia who had previously executed a document stating 
that he would not want to be kept alive if he was dependent on others; although people 
with dementia are dependent on others, they may be perfectly happy and there is no 
reason to refuse medical treatment). 
142. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9702(a)(18) (Supp. 2005). The Vermont law, which 
was enacted in 2005, also calls for the establishment of a central registry or database 
where Vermont citizens can deposit their advance directive information so that it will be 
easily accessible to health care providers. Id. § 9719(b). Because existing law usually 
considers any agency created by a health care power of attorney as terminating at the 
principal's death, some statutes also include a provision that the agency will continue 
past the principal's death for the purposes of organ donation and funeral arrangements. 
See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-6(d) (LexisNexis 2006) ("A medical power of 
attorney representative or surrogate's authority terminates upon the death of the inca­
pacitated person except with respect to decisions regarding autopsy, funeral arrange­
ments or cremation and organ and tissue donation: Provided, That the medical power of 
attorney representative or surrogate has no authority after the death of the incapaci­
tated person to invalidate or revoke a preneed funeral contract executed by the inca­
pacitated person ...."). 
143. If people were not familiar with the concept of advance directives prior to 
the Terry Schiavo case becoming a national story, they certainly were afterward. As 
evidence of the volume of calls attorneys started receiving when the case made the 
headlines, the American Bar Association (ABA) as well as state and local bar associa­
tions provided pamphlets and other information to attorneys so that they could advise 
clients with respect to this area of the law. The ABA also produced a 6-minute feature 
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the other hand, many people wait until they are being admitted to a 
hospital for surgery to execute their advance directives. This may 
not be the best time to make a decision with respect to a funeral. 144 
As a matter of fact, it may be that a better time to fill out such a 
form is during a meeting with a funeral director or when discussing 
financial and estate planning needs. 145 Furthermore, it may be that 
the person who is best able to make medical decisions is not the 
person who is best able to handle the funeral arrangements. 
The optimum solution is to provide individuals with a number 
of choices regarding the disposition of their bodily remains. That is, 
any uniform act should allow people to appoint an agent, or to pro­
vide directions that will be binding when they are gone, or both. In 
that way, each individual can evaluate his or her own situation and 
decide which course is the best based on that information. In addi­
tion, because the law would allow individuals to make a directive, 
but would not require them to, people would also have the freedom 
to be governed by the common law of having the spouse or next of 
kin make decisions, if that is their choice. 
C. Suggested Uniform Disposition of Bodily Remains Act 
A uniform act based upon the current Delaware or Connecti­
cut statutes would provide the most flexibility, while at the same 
time provide the most guidance.146 For example, the laws of both 
story on advance directives for use by television news shows. ABA, Dying Wishes: 
Advance Health Care Directives (transcript available at http://www.abavideonews.orgl 
ABA311/script.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2007»; ABA Dying Wishes: Advance Health 
Directives Main Page, http://www.abavideonews.org!ABA311/index.htm (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2007) (offering the Video News Release to the media under the hyperlink 
"VNR Preview"). 
144. Vermont law recognizes that a person being admitted to a hospital or a nurs­
ing home may be in a position to be unduly influenced by those around him, and there­
fore invalidates an advance directive signed by a person while being admitted to a 
hospital or nursing home unless an ombudsperson, clergy member, attorney, or person 
appointed by the hospital to explain advance directives affirms that he or she has ex­
plained to the patient the ramifications of the document. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§§ 9703(d)-(e) (Supp. 2005). 
145. For example, a survey conducted by the American Association of Retired 
Persons (AARP) in 2005 found that 25 percent of Massachusetts elders had spoken to 
an attorney regarding end of life planning, while only 17 percent had spoken to their 
physician. ERICA DINGER, AARP MASSACHUSErfS END OF LIFE SURVEY 8 (2005), 
available at http://assets.aarp.orglrgcenterlhealth/ma_eol.pdf. 
146. Note, however, that the Delaware law is very similar to the Colorado Dispo­
sitions of Last Remains Act, which was enacted in 2003, one year before the Delaware 
legislature approved its statute. See H.B. 03-1312, 64 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 
2003) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-19-101 to -108 (2005». It is only natural for a 
legislator drafting a bill to look at the laws of other states as a guide, and in fact the 
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states allow the appointment of an agent as well as the provision of 
directions regarding disposition of bodily remains.147 However, be­
cause both statutes lack some important sections, any drafter would 
also have to look beyond those laws and include provisions found in 
the laws of other states. The suggested Uniform Disposition of 
Bodily Remains Act that follows is based mainly on the Delaware 
and Connecticut laws, as well as the Draft Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act.148 The commentary that follows certain sections is not 
intended as an official comment; rather, it is an explanation of cer­
tain elements of the section. 
UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF BODILY REMAINS ACT 
1. Short Title.149 
This [act] may be cited as the Uniform Disposition of Bodily 
Remains Act. 
2. Definitions.15o 
(a) "Adult" means a natural person eighteen years of age or 
older. 
(b) "Bodily Remains" means the deceased's body or cre­
mains15I after death. 
Delaware Health and Human Development Committee Report with respect to the Del­
aware bodily remains statute noted that "[t)here [was) similar legislation in other 
states," indicating that the drafters of the bill had reviewed the laws of other states 
when proposing this legislation. State of Del., Del. Gen. Assembly, Delaware House of 
Representatives Committee Report on House Bill 416 (2004), available at http://www. 
legis.state.de.us (search "Bill Search" for Session "GA 142," Bill Type "HB," and num­
ber "416," then select the icon to the right of "House Committee Report"). 
147. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 262 (Supp. 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 45a-318(a) (West Supp. 2006). 
148. Because at the time this Note was being written, the Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act was in the process of being revised to address legal issues that have arisen 
recently, see supra Part lILA., the Draft Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act was 
used, rather than the final 2006 version. 
149. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (Draft 2006), supra note 62, § 1; see 
also NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFTING RULES FOR 
UNIFORM AND MODEL ACTS RA01 (2006), available at http://www.nccusl.orglUpdate/ 
Docs/DraftingRules_Rev _0106. pdf. 
150. Unless otherwise noted, adapted from DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 260 (Supp. 
2004). 
151. "Cremains" is a term used to refer to a person's cremated remains. See, e.g., 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER's COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 294 (11th ed. 2003) (defining 
"cremains" as "the ashes of a cremated human body"). The concept of adding 
"cremains" as distinct from a person's body was initiated in Colorado by the Judiciary 
committee, after reviewing that state's proposed disposition of last remains document. 
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(c) "Declarant" means a competent adult who signs a declara­
tion pursuant to the provisions of this [act]. A declarant may be a 
"decedent" as that term is used in this [act]. 
(d) "Declaration Instrument" means a written instrument, 
signed by a declarant, governing the disposition of the declarant's 
bodily remains and the ceremonies planned after a declarant's 
death, including a document governing the disposition of bodily re­
mains under this [ act]. Such a declaration may be, but is not re­
quired to be, made within a prepaid funeral, burial, or cremation 
contract with a mortuary or crematorium. 
(e) "Reasonable under the Circumstances," applied to the de­
clarant's instructions, means appropriate in relation to the declar­
ant's finances, cultural or family customs, and religious or spiritual 
beliefs. "Reasonable under the Circumstances" implies considera­
tion of factors that include, but are not limited to, a prepaid funeral, 
burial, or cremation plan of the decedent; the size of the decedent's 
estate; the decedent's cultural or family customs; the decedent's re­
ligious or spiritual beliefs; and the known or reasonably ascertaina­
ble creditors of the decedent. 
(f) "Third Party" 
(1) "Third Party" means a person: 
(A) who is requested by a declaration instrument to 
act in good faith in reliance upon such instrument; 
(B) who is delegated discretion over ceremonial or 
dispositional arrangements in a declaration instrument; or 
(C) who is delegated discretion over ceremonial or 
dispositional arrangements under Section 5. 
(2) "Third Party" includes, but is not limited to, a funeral 
director, mortician, mortuary, crematorium, or cemetery. 
Commentary on Section 2-Definitions 
Declarant: This definition is clear in requiring that a declarant 
be competent.152 As with a last will and testament or health care 
proxy, some states require that the decedent have had the requisite 
capacity to execute the document.153 Some states, such as Arkan-
See COLO. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, HOUSE COMMIlTEE OF REFERENCE REPORT, H. 64­
COOl, 1st Sess., at 1 (2003). 
152. See also infra § 4(a) of the proposed Uniform Disposition of Bodily Remains 
Act. 
153. The Massachusetts organ donor law (based upon the 1968 version of the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act) allows an individual "of sound mind" to make an ana­
tomical gift. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 113, § 8(a) (2004). However, the Uniform Anatomi­
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sas, set the baseline for capacity at an adult "of sound mind."154 
Other states have no explicit mental capacity requirements, al­
though some laws specify that the person be over the age of eigh­
teen.155 The proposed form, in Section 7 of the proposed act, 
requires the witness to attest to the declarant's age and state of 
mind at the time of execution.156 
Reasonable under the Circumstances: When an individual has 
not left clear directions with respect to how his or her body should 
be disposed of, or has not appointed a funeral planning agent, and 
the next of kin cannot agree, the court will have to make the deci­
sion. This language, taken from the Delaware statute, provides un­
ambiguous guidance for courts that are faced with this task. The 
statute is explicit in requiring the court to look at the religious or 
other sociological beliefs of the decedent as well as the decedent's 
financial situation when making its determination. 
3. Scope, Applicability, Exceptions, and Exclusions. 
(a) This [act] applies to a document appointing an agent for 
purposes of disposing of the declarant's bodily remains, specifying 
disposition of the declarant's remains, or both, executed before, on 
or after [the effective date of this act ].157 This [ act] shall also apply 
to the disposition of a person's bodily remains in the event such 
person dies without having a valid declaration instrument in place. 
(b) This [act] shall not be construed to:158 
cal Gift Act promulgated by the NCCUSL merely requires that the individual making 
the gift be over the age of eighteen. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr (Draft 
2006), supra note 62, § 4. Because a competency requirement is favored by some states, 
it is included here to make the statute more acceptable to legislators. 
154. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-17-102(b)(I) (West Supp. 2005); accord CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 45a-318(a) (2006) (stating that "[a]ny person eighteen years of age or older, and 
of sound mind" may sign an advance directive with respect to mortal remains). 
155. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2843-A (Supp. 2005) (no require­
ments); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-509 (LexisNexis 2005) (person must be 
over the age of eighteen); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1339 (2003) (no requirements); 
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 451.650 (LexisNexis 2005) (person must be over the age of 
eighteen); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1151(A) (West 2002) (no requirements); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-26-1 (2004) (no requirements). 
156. See infra text accompanying note 175. In addition, in the event that a legisla­
ture were to adopt the act without including the form, the requirement that the witness 
attest to the declarant's capacity is set forth in Section 4(b) of the proposed act. See 
infra text accompanying note 162. 
157. Adapted from the REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr (Draft 2006), 
supra note 62, § 3. 
158. Taken directly from DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 261 (Supp. 2004). 
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(1) invalidate a declaration instrument or will, codicil, 
trust, power of appointment, or power of attorney; 
(2) invalidate any act of an agent, guardian, or 
conservator; 
(3) affect any claim, right, or remedy that accrued prior to 
the effective date of this [act]; 
(4) authorize or encourage acts that violate the constitu­
tion, statutes, rules, case law, or public policy of [state] or the 
United States; 
(5) abridge contracts; 
(6) modify the standards, ethics, or protocols of the prac­
tice of medicine; 
(7) compel or authorize a health care provider or health 
care facility to administer medical treatment that is medically inap­
propriate or contrary to federal or other [state] law; or 
(8) permit or authorize euthanasia or an affirmative or 
deliberate act to end a person's life. 
Commentary on Section 3-Scope, Applicability, Exceptions, 
and Exclusions 
Subsection (a) makes it clear that if an individual has a declara­
tion instrument in place prior to the enactment of the act, it is not 
necessarily invalidated.159 The language of subsection (b), taken di­
rectly from the Delaware statute, provides some comfort to those 
who would be concerned that this act would allow or encourage 
euthanasia or interfere with the practice of medicine. While this 
language may not be necessary, it is included here as a preemptive 
measure to address concerns some legislators may have about the 
act. Finally, this section clarifies that this act is not intended to ab­
rogate any constitutional rights.160 
4. Declaration of Disposition of Last Remains. 
(a) A competent adult may specify, in a declaration instru­
ment, anyone or more of the following: 161 
(1) the disposition to be made of that person's bodily 
remains; 
159. In fact, many people may have set forth their burial or cremation instruc­
tions in their last will and testament. See supra note 75. 
160. See supra Part III.A.I. 
161. Taken from DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 262 (Supp. 2004). 
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(2) who may direct the disposition of that person's bodily 
remains; 
(3) the ceremonial arrangements to be performed after 
that person's death; 
(4) who may direct the ceremonial arrangements after 
that person's death; or 
(5) the rights, limitations, immunities, and other terms of 
third parties dealing with the declaration instrument. 
(b) The declaration instrument shall be in writing, contain the 
date of its execution, be signed by the declarant, and notarized or 
witnessed in writing by at least one adult who affirms that the no­
tary or witness was present when the declarant signed and dated the 
declaration instrument and that the declarant appeared to be of 
sound mind at the time of execution of the declaration 
instrument.162 
(c) The agent or successor agent appointed in the declaration 
instrument may not act as the witness or the notary public under 
subsection (b) above. In the event an agent or successor agent acts 
as a witness or notary, and there are no other disinterested wit­
nesses, the declaration instrument is not invalidated by that fact 
alone; however, the interested witness may not act as the agent or 
successor agent. 
Commentary on Section 4-Declaration of Disposition of 
Last Remains 
This portion of the act provides flexibility by allowing an indi­
vidual to direct what should happen to his bodily remains and at the 
same time allowing for the appointment of an agent to carry out 
those wishes.163 Subsection (a)(5), which is taken directly from the 
Delaware statute, allows a declarant to negate the terms of this act 
which limit the liability of third parties relying on a declaration in­
strument. Although it is doubtful that many people would take ad­
vantage of this option, it is included in order to provide options in 
the event a declarant feels the protections afforded by the statute 
are unnecessary or should be limited. 
162. Adapted from the Arizona cremation authorization statute. See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 32-1365.01(B) (2002). Based on the differing requirements for due execu­
tion from state to state, there is a concern that a disposition directive or appointment­
of-agent document that was signed in accordance with the laws of one state would not 
be valid in another state. 
163. See supra Part III.B. 
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Subsection (c) clarifies that a person who is appointed as the 
agent in a declaration instrument should not act as a witness or no­
tary. Although the Uniform Probate Code drafters have eliminated 
the requirements of disinterested witnesses in the execution of 
wills,164 many state laws still include provisions invalidating a testa­
mentary disposition to an interested witness.165 Therefore, this sec­
tion is included in order to make the law more appealing to 
legislatures. 
5. 	 Disposition of Bodily Remains in the Absence of a 
Declaration Instrument or if Appointed Agent Cannot 
Act.166 
(a) In the absence of a valid declaration instrument, or in the 
event that an individual and any alternate designated in a declara­
tion instrument decline to act, are unable to act because of death or 
disability, or cannot be located within forty-eight hours after the 
time of death or the discovery of the body, the following individu­
als, in the priority listed, shall have the right to custody and control 
of the disposition of a person's body upon the death of such person: 
(1) The deceased person's spouse, unless such spouse is 
legally separated from the decedent, has abandoned the deceased 
person prior to the deceased person's death, or has been adjudged 
incapable by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
[(i-A) The deceased person's domestic partner. For pur­
poses of this section, "domestic partner" means one of two unmar­
ried adults who are domiciled together under long-term 
arrangements that evidence a commitment to remain responsible 
indefinitely for each other's welfare ];167 
164. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-505 (2005). The Comment to § 2-505 states 
that a large gift given to a witness is "a suspicious circumstance" that might give rise to 
a challenge, but that in cases of undue influence, the wrongdoer usually finds witnesses 
who are not interested so as not to arouse suspicion. Id. § 2-505 cmt. 
165. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 2 (2004). Similarly, the Massachusetts 
health care proxy law does not allow a person named as proxy to act as a witness. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 2 (2004). 
166. Unless otherwise noted, this section is adapted from CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 45a-318(c) (West Supp. 2006). The language "whose whereabouts are generally 
ascertainable" is taken from DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 264 (Supp. 2004). 
167. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2843-A(I)(D)(I-A) (West Supp. 2005). Mis­
souri law takes a novel approach in addressing the needs of same-sex partners. Under 
Missouri law, a person has the right to designate who that person's next of kin is, re­
gardless of whether the person is a relative. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.119(8) (West 2004). 
This law addresses the needs of same-sex partners in that it allows a person to designate 
just who is his "family." A Missouri senator, perhaps in reaction to that concept, has 
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(2) A majority of the deceased person's surviving adult 
children whose whereabouts are reasonably ascert~inable; 
(3) The deceased person's surviving parents or legal 
guardians whose whereabouts are reasonably ascertainable;168 
(4) A majority of the deceased person's adult surviving 
siblings whose whereabouts are reasonably ascertainable; 
(5) Any adult person in the next degree of kinship in the 
order named by law to inherit the deceased person's estate, pro­
vided such adult person shall be of the third degree of kinship or 
higher; 
(6) Such adult person as the [probate court)169 shall 
determine. 
introduced a bill deleting that language from the statute. See S.B. 366, 93rd Gen. As­
sem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005), available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/05info/pdf-bilU/ 
introISB366.pdf. As of this writing, the bill has been recommended as "do pass" by the 
Senate Judiciary and Civil & Criminal Jurisprudence Committee and has gone through 
two readings. Bill Summary, Missouri S.B. 366, http://www.senate.mo.gov/05info/ 
BTS_ Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=r&BillID=14858 (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). In many 
states, rights of domestic partners must be added piecemeal to each statute (for exam­
ple, to the bodily remains legislation, to advance directive legislation, etc.) because vot­
ers have adopted constitutional amendments declaring that marriage is only between a 
man and a woman, and therefore a global grant to domestic partners of spousal rights 
would be unconstitutional in those states. See, e.g., Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 03004, 
2003 WL 21207498 (Mar. 10, 2003) (opining that it would be unconstitutional if the 
legislature passed a law allowing domestic partners to make decisions with respect to 
organ donation and disposition of remains). Shortly after the Nebraska Attorney Gen­
eral's Office issued its opinion, the Nebraska statute regarding control of a decedent's 
remains was amended to provide that a person may designate an agent to dispose of the 
body. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1339 (LexisNexis 2003). The law had previously 
allowed the next of kin to make such decisions. 2003 Neb. Laws 95. 
168. The District of Columbia, most likely in an attempt to avoid court actions 
when members of a class could not agree, gave the "oldest adult member" of the class 
priority over the other class members for the purpose of disposition of remains. D.C. 
CODE § 2-2813(a) (Supp. 1987), invalidated by Parker v. Horton's Funeral Serv., Inc., 
200 F.R.D. 1 (2001). However, the statute went on to list the classes as follows: 
"[s]pouse, adult child, father, mother, adult brother, adult sister," etc. [d. (emphasis 
added). Because the law clearly preferred a male parent to a female parent, the law 
was declared unconstitutional. Parker, 200 F.R.D. 1. Rather than merely replacing "fa­
ther, mother" with "parent," and "adult brother, adult sister" with "sibling," however, 
the legislature rewrote the law, and now requires a majority of the siblings if more than 
one, and expresses no preference between parents; that is, both parents would have to 
agree on the disposition. D.C. CODE §§ 3-413(a)(2)-(3) (LexisNexis 2003). In a case 
where the parents could not agree, the new law places the onus of deciding which par­
ent would have the right to control upon the court. 
169. The type of court to be inserted should be the same as that in the "jurisdic­
tion" portion of the suggested uniform act. See infra Section 9 and Commentary on 
Section 9. 
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(b) Any person acting pursuant to this section shall be subject 
to the directions for disposition provided by the decedent in accor­
dance with Section 4. 
Commentary on Section 5-Disposition of Bodily Remains in the 

Absence of a Declaration Instrument or If Appointed 

Agent Cannot Act 

This section tracks the original common law notion that an in­
dividual's next of kin shall have custody or control of the body. 
However, subsection (b) clarifies that the decedent's wishes are 
controlling and should be accorded the proper respect. 
6. Prohibition Against Certain Persons Acting As Agent. 
The following persons shall not have the ability to direct the 
disposition of the decedent's remains and shall not be eligible to act 
as the agent of the decedent pursuant to Section 4 or be allowed 
custody and control under Section 5: 
(a) A person who has been arrested for unlawfully and inten­
tionally committing an act against the decedent that resulted in or 
contributed to the death of the decedent, unless the charges against 
said person have been dismissed or the person was found not guilty 
of said charges by a court of law.17° 
(b) The spouse of the decedent if the spouse and decedent are 
legally separated or divorced at the time of the death of the dece­
dent, unless the decedent has appointed the spouse to act as the 
decedent's agent in a valid declaration instrument executed after 
the date of such separation or divorce, as the case may be.l71 
(c) The decedent's parent if that parent's parental rights have 
been terminated by court order.172 
170. This section is adapted from FLA. STAT. ANN. § 497.005(37) (West 2006). 
171. See COLO. STAT. ANN. § 15-19-107(4)(a) (West 2005), which specifically re­
vokes an appointment of the decedent's spouse as agent if the parties were legally sepa­
rated or divorced after the appointment-of-agent document was signed, unless the 
instrument specifically states otherwise. However, the remainder of the appointment­
of-agent document will stand. Id. § 15-19-107(4)(b); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
22, § 2843-A(3) (2004) (prohibiting a spouse who was estranged from the decedent 
from having control of the remains but not explicitly applying this provision to a spouse 
named as agent in an authority document). 
172. Taken from 2005 Tex. H.B. No. 3015. 
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Commentary on Section 6-Prohibition of Certain Persons 
Acting as Agent 
Many states include provisions for when death is caused by the 
next of kin. Florida's law was recently amended to exclude from 
the definition of "legally authorized person" a spouse who has been 
arrested for committing domestic violence upon the decedent which 
contributed to the death of the decedent,173 Similarly, California 
law provides that if an individual who has been designated as an 
agent or who is the next of kin "has been charged with first or sec­
ond degree murder or voluntary manslaughter in connection with 
the decedent's death," that individual shall not have the ability to 
control the disposition of the decedent's remains, unless the charges 
are dismissed or the individual is acquitted,174 
Subsections (b) and (c) clarify what happens in the event 
spouses are separated or divorced, or a parent's rights have been 
terminated by judicial action. However, a declarant who wishes to 
appoint an ex-spouse may do so by executing a declaration instru­
ment appointing that individual after the separation or divorce. 
7. Form. 
(a) The following is a suggested form of declaration 
instrument:175 
DECLARATION OF DISPOSITION OF BODILY REMAINS 
I, (Name of Declarant), being of sound mind and law­
ful age, hereby revoke all directives and instructions regarding the 
disposition of my bodily remains and revoke all appointments of 
agents with respect to the disposition of my bodily remains, 
whether they be set forth in a will, codicil, trust, power of appoint­
173. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 497.005(37) (West 2006) (added in 2004 by 2004 Fla. 
Laws, ch. 2004-301, § 6). Note, however, that the statute is not clear if the provision 
applies when a spouse has been appointed as agent by the decedent, or only if the 
spouse is acting as next of kin when the decedent did not leave other instructions. 
While this is similar to a "slayer statute" prohibiting a decedent's killer from inheriting 
from the estate of the decedent, the language is slightly different. The Florida slayer 
statute prohibits a survivor who "unlawfully and intentionally kills or participates in 
procuring the death of the decedent" from taking under the decedent's will or through 
the laws of intestacy. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802(1) (West 2006). 
174. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100(b) (West Supp. 2006). The California 
code is much clearer in specifying that the prohibition applies to a person acting as 
agent or next of kin, unlike the Florida law. See supra note 173. 
175. Except as otherwise noted, this form is adapted from the Delaware disposi­
tion of last remains statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 265 (Supp. 2004). 
-----
-----
-----
-----
609 2007) THE CASE FOR A UNIFORM BODILY REMAINS LAW 
ment, or power of attorney. However, this instrument does not re­
voke my prior instructions regarding organ donation unless section 
V below is completed. 
I hereby declare and direct that after my death the following provi­
sions be taken: 
I. If permitted by law, my body shall be (Initial ONE choice): 
Buried. I direct that my body be buried at 
Cremated. I direct that my cremated remains be 
disposed of as follows: 
Entombed. I direct that my body be entombed at 
-::--::-:--___ Other. I direct that my body be disposed of as 
follows: 
Disposed of according to the directions of my agent or 
successor agent as set forth in section IV below. 
II. I hereby request the following funeral or memorial services 
(initial any which apply): 
_--:-___ Funeral. I request the following arrangements for 
my funeral: 
Memorial Service. I request the following arrange­
------:-­
ments for my memorial service: 
III. Special Instructions. In addition to the instructions above, I 
request (on the following lines you may make special requests re­
garding ceremonies, lack of ceremonies, or disposition of your 
remains): 
Note: Those persons or entities asked to carry out a declarant's 
intent regarding disposition of last remains and ceremonial arrange­
ments need do so only if the declarant's intent is reasonable under 
the circumstances. "Reasonable under the Circumstances" may 
------------------
-------------------
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take into consideration factors such as a known prepaid funeral, 
burial, or cremation plan of the declarant, the size of the declarant's 
estate, cultural or family customs, the declarant's religious or spiri­
tual beliefs, the known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of the 
declarant, and the declarant's financial situation prior to death. 
IV. I hereby appoint , having an address 
and telephone number of to have custody 
and control of my bodily remains to act as my agent to carry out 
the disposition directions expressed in this document. If 
shall decline to act, be unable to act because 
------~--~~~--
of death or disability, or cannot be located within forty-eight (48) 
hours of my death or the discovery of my body, then 
___________, having an address and telephone number of 
, shall act in that person's place or steadP6 
I may revoke or amend this declaration in writing at any time. I 
agree that a third party who receives a copy of this declaration may 
act according to it. Revocation of this declaration is not effective as 
to a third party until the third party learns of my revocation. My 
estate shall indemnify any third party for costs incurred as a result 
of claims that arise against the third party because of a good-faith 
reliance on this declaration. 
I execute this declaration as my free and voluntary act, on 
(Declarant's signature) _________________ 
I, the undersigned, have witnessed the signing of this document by 
the Declarant, or at the direction of the Declarant, and state that 
the Declarant appears to be at least eighteen years of age, of sound 
mind, and under no constraint or undue influence. I have not been 
named as agent in this document. 
(Witness signature) 
V. The following section regarding organ and tissue donation is 
optional. To make a donation, initial the option you select and sign 
below. Note: If you have previously made provisions for the dona­
tion of one or more of your organs in a separate document, and that 
document continues to express your current wishes, you should not 
complete this section in order to avoid revocation of the prior organ 
donation directive. 
176. This sentence is adapted from the Connecticut bodily remains statute. See 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-318(d) (West Supp. 2006). 
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In the hope that I might help others, I hereby make an anatomical 
gift, to be effective upon my death, of: 
A. __'--__ Any needed organs/tissues. 
B. The following organs/tissues: 
Donor signature:_____________________ 
[Notarization Optional] 
(b) The form set forth in subsection (a) is optional and nonex­
clusive, and a person may use another form of declaration instru­
ment if it substantially complies with the statutory requirements of 
this [act ].177 
(c) A declaration instrument may be acknowledged, but lack 
of acknowledgment shall not render the declaration ineffective. 
Commentary on Section 7-Form 
The NCCUSL recommends that statutory forms be avoided in 
uniform acts.178 Due to the difficulty in reproducing the forms in a 
statutory text because they contain blank spaces for inserting per­
sonal information, different indentation, spacing, etc., the NCCUSL 
suggests delegating the task of drafting a form to a state agency.179 
However, as of this writing, approximately eleven states include as 
part of their mortal remains statutes a sample form for appointing 
an agent or directing the disposition of remains.180 Furthermore, 
there are several advantages to including a model form as part of a 
uniform act. First, it would allow laypersons access to the forms. 
For example, a funeral director could make a photocopy of the stat­
utory form and provide it to a customer, much like a hospital can 
provide an advance directive form to an incoming patient. Neither 
177. This subsection is adapted from the North Carolina health care power of 
attorney statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25 (2005). 
178. NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFTING RULES FOR 
UNIFORM AND MODEL Acrs 20 (2006), available at http://www.nccusl.orgiUpdate/ 
Docs/DraftingRules_Rev_01 06. pdf. 
179. Id. 
180. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-19-107 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 45a-318 (West Supp. 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 265 (Supp. 2004); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 31-36-10 (2006); 755 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 65/10 (West Supp. 2006); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-632 (2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145C.16 (West 2005); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 451.650 (LexisNexis 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25; OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 97-130(7) (2005); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(b) (Vernon 2003). 
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the hospital nor the funeral director would be accused of the unli­
censed practice of law in those situations. 
Second, the entities who ultimately rely on the forms when dis­
posing of remains, such as crematories, will feel more comfortable if 
the forms they receive, and are expected to act in accordance with, 
all look essentially the same and have the same information. In 
that way, a crematory operator would not have to contact an attor­
ney every time he or she received a designation of agent or disposal 
of remains directive to make sure that it complied with the statute. 
Third, if forms are drafted in "plain language," they will be 
easier for people to understand and the likelihood of ambiguity or 
mistakes would be lessened. Finally, an individual's appointment of 
an agent for the disposal of remains or a directive regarding the 
disposition of remains is not something that would generally re­
quire the services of a lawyer. In all likelihood, a funeral director 
would be knowledgeable about what an individual can legally do 
with his remains181 and what type of family member or friend would 
be the best person to act as agent.182 
The use of the form is merely recommended and is not 
mandatory. The act is clear in providing that another document 
which is executed in accordance with the act will be acceptable. 
With respect to the language regarding organ donation, any 
state adopting this act should determine the requirements of the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act as enacted in that state to determine 
the witness requirements of that state's donor law. 
8. Payment for Disposition; Unlawful Disposition.1s3 
(a) If the declarant directs a disposition in a valid declaration 
instrument and those financially responsible for the disposition are 
without sufficient funds to pay for such disposition or are unwilling 
to pay for such disposition, and the estate of the declarant has insuf­
ficient funds to pay for the disposition, the wishes of the decedent 
181. For example, if a Massachusetts citizen wanted his remains cryonically fro­
zen, the remains would have to be shipped outside of Massachusetts. See infra note 
184. 
182. Funeral directors are likely to have seen many family arguments over the 
disposition of remains; and in fact, they are probably more familiar with the spectacle 
than many attorneys. Furthermore, an AARP study revealed that many more people 
were comfortable talking with their family or friends about end-of-life issues rather 
than an attorney or physician. DINGER, supra note 145, at 8. 
183. This section is adapted from the Oregon and California sepulture statutes. 
See OR. REV. STAT. § 97.130(6) (2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100.1(a)(2) 
(West Supp. 2006). 
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shall be carried out only to the extent that the decedent has suffi­
cient assets to do so, unless the person or persons who otherwise 
have the right to control the disposition and arrange for funeral 
goods and services agree to assume the cost. 
(b) If the direction of the declarant is unlawful, the direction 
shall be void and disposition shall be in accordance with the direc­
tion provided by the agent appointed pursuant to Section 4, or if no 
agent is appointed or able to serve, by those persons given priority 
in Section 5; provided, however, that the disposition shall be rea­
sonable under the circumstances. 
Commentary on Section 8-Payment for Disposition; 

Unlawful Disposition 

Each state has its own laws with respect to how a body can be 
disposed.184 This portion of the act helps to avoid litigation by pro­
viding an alternative scheme when an individual's directions are il­
legal or unaffordable. However, by including the "reasonable 
under the circumstances" language, this section also makes clear 
that the decedent's wishes should be taken into account. 
9. Jurisdiction. 
The [probate court] for the district of the domicile or residence 
of a deceased person shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide any 
issue regarding the custody, control, or disposition of the deceased 
person's body, upon such notice to interested parties as the court 
shall determine.18s Any order issued by the court shall be consis­
tent with the decedent's last wishes to the extent they are reasona­
ble under the circumstances.186 
Commentary on Section 9-1urisdiction 
In order to avoid confusion, the act allows the state legislature 
to choose a specific court as the proper forum for deciding matters 
involving the disposition of bodily remains. The proposed act in­
serts "probate court" because the topic of disposition of bodily re­
184. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 114, § 43M (2004) ("Except as otherwise pro­
vided by law ... every dead body of a human being dying within the commonwealth ... 
shall be decently buried, entombed in a mausoleum, vault or tomb or cremated within a 
reasonable time after death."). 
185. This language is adapted from the Connecticut bodily remains statute. See 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-318(e) (West Supp. 2006). 
186. This language is adapted from the Delaware disposition of last remains stat­
ute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 264(c) (Supp. 2004). 
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mains is similar to the disposition of property under a will, and in 
many states the probate courts are charged with oversight of this 
matter. The language "upon such notice to interested parties as the 
court shall determine" is an attempt at addressing possible due pro­
cess issues187 while at the same time providing flexibility so that the 
probate court can address each case as the situation requires. How­
ever, each legislature should review the court system of its state and 
determine which court is best suited to administer these types of 
cases, based upon such considerations as whether the courts have 
equitable powers and the types of cases handled by the courts. 
10. Nonliability[; Penalties for Non Compliance],188 
(a) Subject to subsection (c) below, a third party who acts in 
accordance with this [act] or with the applicable law with respect to 
disposition of bodily remains of another state or another country or 
attempts in good faith to do so is not liable for the act in a civil 
action or criminal proceeding or subject to discipline for unprofes­
sional conduct. 
(b) If a third party makes an anatomical gift in accordance 
with the declaration instrument, neither the third party making the 
gift nor the estate of the decedent shall be liable for any injury or 
damage that may result from the making or the use of an anatomi­
cal gift.1 89 
(c) Subsection (a) does not apply to an agent who knows that 
a declaration instrument has been amended or revoked and the 
agent's actions are inconsistent with the revocation or amendment. 
[(d) Any person who knowingly fails to follow the directions 
as to the manner in which the body of the declarant shall be dis­
posed of as set forth in a valid declaration instrument, upon con vic­
187. See supra Part lILA. 
188. Unless otherwise noted, this section is adapted from the 2006 draft of the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (Draft 
2006), supra note 62, § 17. 
189. In order to track the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, the drafter should re­
view the current version of that Act to determine whether the drafters have included a 
provision imposing liability for one who knowingly authorizes the donation of organs 
from a person who had HIV or hepatitis. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 
§ 18 (Draft 2005) (marginal comment), available at http://www.law.upenn.eduibIVulc/ 
uagal2005StrikeScore.pdf. The provision was not included in the final 2006 version of 
the Act. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006), available at http://www. 
law.upenn.eduIb1i/ulc/uaga/2006final.pdf. 
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tion thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine 
of not more than $5,000].190 
Commentary on Section 10-Nonliability[; Penalties for 
Non Compliance] 
Subsection (d) is provided as an optional section because very 
few states include penalties in their statutes. However, there would 
seem to be a better chance that a person's directions will be fol­
lowed if there are penalties for non-compliance.191 At the same 
time, in order that funeral directors can do their jobs without the 
specter of litigation constantly hanging over their heads, this section 
also provides immunity for good faith actors. 
11. Choice of Law; Validity.192 
(a) A declaration instrument is valid if executed in accordance 
with this [act], the laws of the place where it was executed, or the 
laws of the place where the person making the declaration instru­
ment was domiciled, has a place of residence, or was a national at 
the time the declaration instrument was executed. 
(b) A person may assume that a declaration instrument is 
valid unless that person knows that it was not validly executed or 
was revoked. 
(c) The provisions of the most recent declaration instrument 
shall control over any other document regarding the disposition of 
190. This subsection is taken from the Oklahoma sepulture statute. OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 1151(C) (West 2002). The brackets indicate that the language is optional. 
191. Even in the absence of a statutory penalty, there are repercussions for death 
care industry workers who fail to follow the rules. In Oregon, a crematory worker lost 
his job after he allowed a woman's body to be cremated without first obtaining permis­
sion from the decedent's husband pursuant to Oregon law. Jones v. Employment 
Dep't, 112 P.3d 453, 453-54 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 97.130(2)(a) 
(2005». While this sounds like a justified firing, there were extenuating circumstances. 
The decedent had died as a result of being shot by her husband. !d. at 454. The em­
ployee obtained authorization to cremate the woman's body from her other family 
members; however, state law required the husband's authorization before the crema­
tion could be performed, and the husband was in jail. Id. The employee contacted the 
husband's attorney, who promised to obtain the husband's signature. [d. Finally, al­
most a month after the woman's death, although he had not received the husband's 
written permission, the employee gave in to the demands of the decedent's family and 
ordered the cremation of the body. Id. 
192. Unless otherwise noted, this section is adapted from the 2006 draft of the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GlFr ACT (Draft 
2006), supra note 62, § 18. 
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bodily remains.193 However, an anatomical gift document executed 
after a declaration instrument shall not invalidate the declaration 
instrument in its entirety. If the two documents conflict with re­
spect to a certain provision, the more recent document shall 
control. 
Commentary on Section ll-Choice of Law; Validity 
One of the strongest reasons for adopting a uniform act with 
respect to bodily remains is the desire to make bodily remains dec­
larations portable from state to state.194 Any uniform act should 
alleviate most of the problems with portability of documents by 
promulgating a model form and setting forth the requirements for 
due execution. However, in the event that a state adopts the act 
without including the form, and for purposes of clarity, this section 
makes it clear that a validly executed bodily remains directive exe­
cuted in another state will be accepted by the state adopting this 
act. The Colorado and Delaware disposition statutes do not go far 
enough when they state that the statutes apply to documents exe­
cuted by a resident of that state within the state as well as to docu­
ments signed by a resident of that state when the document is 
executed.195 These laws are not clear as to whether they preclude a 
document executed by a resident of another state who wants to be 
buried or cremated within Colorado or Delaware from being effec­
tive. In contrast, the Vermont advance directive statute is much 
clearer in stating that "[n]othing in this [law] limits the enforceabil­
ity of an advance directive or similar instrument executed in an­
other state or jurisdiction in compliance with the law of that state or 
jurisdiction."196 
Subsection (c) states that the most recent document shall con­
trol. However, to allow for the possibility that a disposition of re­
mains document and an anatomical gift document might be 
executed at different times, the law is clear that the recent docu­
ment shall not revoke the prior document. But where the provi­
sions conflict, the most recent document shall control. 
193. This language was adapted from DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 266(d) (Supp. 
2004). 
194. See supra Part H.B. 
195. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-19-104(4) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 12, § 266( c). 
196. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9716 (Supp. 2005). 
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12. Uniformity of Application and Construction.197 
In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must 
be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect 
to its subject matter among states that enact it. 
13. Severability; Conflict with Other Laws.198 
(a) If any provision of this [act] or its application to any person 
or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other 
provisions or applications of this [act] which can be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the pro­
visions of this [act] are severable. 
(b) In the event this [act] conflicts with any other laws of this 
state, the provisions of this [act] shall control. [However, in the 
event any provision of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act conflicts 
with this [act], the provisions of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
shall control.] 
Commentary on Section 13-Severability; Conflict with 
Other Laws 
The severability clause is new to the UAGA. However, the 
NCCUSL recommends a provision regarding severability where 
there is a danger of the law being partially invalidated by an ex­
isting law.199 Here, there is a concern that this act may conflict with 
the provisions of the anatomical gift law enacted by the state. Sub­
section (b) is added as a saving clause to avoid minor conflicts with 
other laws of the state. Certainly, any state adopting a uniform act 
must carefully review its existing laws to determine whether there 
are any conflicts. On the other hand, in states that have already 
enacted bodily remains statutes, the whole statute should be re­
placed with the uniform act provisions.2°° 
197. This section tracks the language in the 2006 draft of the Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr (Draft 2006), supra note 62, 
§ 23. 
198. This section tracks the language in the 2005 draft of the Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr (Draft 2005), supra note 189, 
§ 23. 
199. NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFTING RULES FOR 
UNIFORM AND MODEL Acrs, supra note 178, at 23-24, 26 Rule 604. 
200. In Massachusetts, for example, the current regulations are not clear as to the 
manner in which a person may direct the disposition of his or her remains, but do 
prescribe who shall have control over a decedent's remains. 239 MASS. CODE REGS. 
3.09 (2005); see supra text accompanying note 35. In the event the Massachusetts legis­
-------------------
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The second sentence of subsection (b) is optional. It allows a 
legislature to be clear that organ donation is more important than 
adhering to a decedent's wishes with respect to burial or cremation, 
and that therefore the state's organ donation laws should supersede 
the disposition of bodily remains statutes in the event of a conflict 
between the two. 
14. Effective Date.201 
This [act] takes effect 
CONCLUSION 
Funeral planning is an intensely personal decision-making pro­
cess. Unfortunately, the laws of some states do not afford citizens 
the opportunity to provide directions on how their bodily remains 
are to be disposed of after death. Even in those states that do allow 
people to pre-plan funerals, there is little statutory assurance that 
those directions will be followed. Because of the importance to 
many people of what happens to their bodies post-mortem, state 
legislatures should provide citizens with clear-cut directions on how 
an individual may pre-plan a funeral or appoint an agent, and how 
to ensure that directions are carried out. One way to help the states 
in enacting this needed legislation is the development of a uniform 
disposition of bodily remains act allowing for the appointment of an 
agent and the provision of an advance directive as part of a funeral 
planning document. 
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lature was to adopt a uniform act, the Code section would most likely need to be re­
placed in its entirety. 
201. This section tracks the language in the 2006 draft of the Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (Draft 2006), supra note 62, 
§ 26. 
* The author would like to thank Brian Cahillane, Note Editor, and Matt Drex­
ler, Symposium Editor, of the Western New England Law Review, for their assistance 
in editing this Note. The author would also like to thank Kate Irwin, Research Libra­
rian at the Western New England College School of Law, for her research assistance. 
